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Land use controls in Iowa, as in other states, exist in a variety of
forms. Both the substance and structure of these controls continually
change to meet the needs of a developing society. Recent and rapid
technological growth, together with the spread of population, indicate
that there is a growing interdependence between land use and land
users. As a result of this interdependence and the complex nature of our
technological and economic environment, the number of governmental
regulations is increasing rapidly.'
In a less complex society, private land use controls evolved to resolve
land use issues between private parties. The use of covenants and
easements proved to be a simple means of providing for private land use
arrangements.! To this day, private controls, particularly covenants, still
play an important role in modern land development.'
In addition to the private arrangements, the common law developed
various judicial doctrines directly related to land use. The maxim sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a manner as
not to injure that of another) states the guiding principle of land use con-
trols as generally recognized at common law and summarizes the heart of
the law of nuisance.' Other common law judicial doctrines governing one's
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Part V.
1. C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 3 (3d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as HAAR ON PLAN-
NING].
2. C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 445-575 (2d ed. 1975); J. CRIBBET. PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 333-61 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as CRIBBETI; J. CASNER & B.
LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 983-1190 (2d ed. 1969); R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL
ON REAL PROPERTY 527-89, 703-46 (abr. ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as POWELL].
3. HAAR ON PLANNING, supra note 1, at 781-860. The use of covenants to protect the
nature and character of large scale residential or commercial developments is particularly ex-
tensive.
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1551 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See CRIBBET, supra note 2, at
362-64; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 571-612 (4th ed. 1971). The law of
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use of land include the law of equitable servitudes,' the doctrine of waste6
and the law of support.7
However, the growth of population and the expansion of industry and
commerce which resulted in the complex socio-econ6mic-political pheno-
menon known as the industrial revolution exposed the inadequacy of the
common law as a means of solving land use problems.' Consequently, a
need for governmental regulation of land use became apparent.' This Ar-
ticle will focus on the two predominant governmental controls utilized in
Iowa-zoning and planning. Next, the Article will examine the existing
body of land use law in Iowa. Finally, current legislative land use pro-
posals will be examined.
nuisance remains a valuable land use device and has two distinct applications. First, nuisance
theory can be utilized as an independent basis attacking one's use of property, regardless of
zoning. In a 1951 case, a landowner brought an injunctive action against his neighbor's use of
property as a nursery school in a residential district. The suit was based on nuisance and ad-
ditionally, on the alleged violation of the zoning ordinance. The Iowa Supreme Court held
that the school was a permitted use and that the plaintiff failed to show either noncompliance
with local safety and health standards or improper vehicular use of private drives so as to
give rise to an action to enjoin the operation of the school. Livingston v. Davis, 243 Iowa 21,
50 N.W.2d 592 (1951).
Secondly, nuisance theory can be applied to a land user who violates a particular
zoning restriction. This latter situation is illustrated in Town of Grundy Center v. Marion,
231 Iowa 425, 1 N.W.2d 677 (1942), where a landowner was sued by the municipality for viola-
tion of a municipal ordinance which proscribed the use of property as a junkyard within 300
feet of a business or residential zone. The injunction issued and was sustained by the Iowa
Supreme Court. The court held that the violation of the ordinance constituted a nuisance and
that the city had the right to bring such actions to restrain and abate that particular use of
property. Id. See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) wherein the
constitutional justification for zoning was based in part on nuisance theory. Accord, City of
Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 184 N.W. 823 (1921), sup. op., 193 Iowa
1096, 188 N.W. 921 (1922).
5. See generally AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 9.24-.40 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952);
Paulus, Use of Equitable Servitudes in Land Planning, 2 WILLAMETTE L.J. 399 (1963); Reno,
The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land, 28 VA. L. REV. 951 (1942).
6. POWELL, supra note 2, at 679-91.
7. CRIBBET, supra note 2, at 364-67; POWELL, supra note 2, at 759-73.
8. Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State and Local Programs, 50 IOWA L. REV.
367 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Cunningham].
9. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the relative merits of government-
al regulation versus private or judicial controls. Some commentators suggest that govern-
mental controls are economically inefficient with the consequent effect of creating adverse or
incompatible and counterproductive land uses. See B. SIEGAN, PLANNING WITHOUT PRICES
(1977); Siegan, No Zoning is the Best Zoning, in No LAND IS AN ISLAND 157 (1975); Gramm &
Ekelund, Land Use Planning: The Market Alternative, in No LAND IS AN ISLAND 127 (1975);
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (B. Ackerman ed. 1975); THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL
RELATIONSHIPS (H. Manne ed. 1975); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1973).
1977-19781
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B. Governmental Controls
In order to emphasize the variety of land use controls and regulations
utilized by the government, a brief discussion of the available control
mechanisms is necessary. In Iowa, there exists a number of interrelated
but not necessarily interdependent statutes dealing with land controls.
Basically, land use is institutionalized on the local" and county1 level.
1. Eminent Domain
One of the most dramatic exercises of the government's power over
one's private use of land is that of eminent domain.12 The use of this in-
herent power of sovereignty can be exercised by a number of state and
governmental subdivisions as well as delegated to private units affected
with public purpose. The effect of eminent domain is to remove the use of
land from a private sector for the benefit of the public.
While the major concern of the landowner is what land will be taken,
the value of that land and damage to remaining lands," this is only of in-
cidental importance to the public. The critical public issue is what are the
consequences of a particular taking. While economic efficiency is an im-
portant public goal, other considerations which should be taken into ac-
count include the preservation of natural resources, stimulation of
economic growth, maximum efficiency and compatibility of land users and
public welfare issues such as relocation assistance. 5 Thus, the exercise of
the power of eminent domain has far reaching consequences for the land-
owner and the public alike; it is a governmental land use control the im-
pact of which cannot be overlooked.
10. See IOWA CODE §§ 409, 414, 473A (1977).
11. See id. §§ 358A.3, 359.1. This includes unincorporated townships.
12. IOWA CONST. art. I, § 18 (1857, amended 1908).
13. A compilation of those entities authorized to exercise the power of eminent do-
main can be found in Note, Contemporary Studies Project: New Perspectives on Iowa Emi-
nent Domain, 54 IOWA L. REV. 737-39 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Contemporary Studies Note].
14. The law of damages and the valuation process constitutes the bulk of eminent do-
main law. The literature in this area is rich as well as technical. See, e.g., P. NICOLS, THE
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1976); L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1953); Berger, Current Problems Affecting Costs of Condemnation, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
85 (1961); Cromwell, Some Elements of Damage in Condemnation, 43 IOWA L. REV. 191 (1958);
Spies & McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent Domain, 48 VA. L. REV.
437 (1962); Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment. Incidental
Losses, 67 YALE L. J. 61 (1957).
15. Contemporary Studies Note, supra note 13. This comment is a detailed study of
Iowa eminent domain law and should serve as a basic guide in the area. However, the deci-
sion of how to utilize land does not occur in a vacuum. Various factors, including the effects
on people, their jobs, the ecology and the economy are directly affected. Any land use system
must take into consideration all integral parts. A vivid account of the elimination of a
neighborhood by eminent domain with a disregard of the human factors is given in R. CARO,
THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 849-50 (First Vintage ed.
1975).
[Vol. 27
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2. Municipal Finance-Urban Renewal
On a more local level is the municipality's ability to tax, borrow and
spend for the purposes of funding municipal organizations and providing
municipal services and improvements. The exercise of these powers have
a direct impact on land use by affecting land value and the development
of the municipality."
The most noticeable way the powers of municipal finance are used to
alter the character of land use is through urban renewal."' Pursuant to
the Iowa Urban Renewal Law,'" a municipality has wide ranging authori-
ty to eliminate the blight created by slum conditions." Using a vast array
of powers to deal with this complex problem, including taxing, financing,
borrowing, condemnation and planning," the basic technique is to develop
a general municipal plan, adopted after public hearings." The municipali-
ty then acquires private property by purchase or condemnation and
resells the land to a private developer.'
What makes urban renewal distinctive among land planning devices
is its breadth. The local municipality is given controlling authority to
make substantial physical changes which have equally substantial
economic and societal impact."
The determination as to what area is to be the target of an urban
renewal project is a legislative one, political in nature, and involves ques-
tions of public policy. It is a determination for the city to make and can-
not be overturned unless it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable."' As
a result, a large amount of planning is required in terms of capital expen-
ditures, availability of funds and other financing considerations. Tax base
issues and land uses additionally must be taken into account as well as
the more people-oriented issues such as relocation and neighborhood
restructuring. The issue raised but unanswered is whether the local
municipality can perform this function efficiently.
16. IOWA CODE ch. 384 (1977). See Hayes, Survey of Iowa Law: Iowa Tax Law and
Procedure-1972, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 550 (1972).
17. IOWA CODE ch. 403 (1977).
18. Id.
19. HAAR on PLANNING, supra note 1, at 604-780; D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 368-428 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HAGMAN].
20. IOWA CODE §§ 403.2, 403.6 (1977).
21. Id. § 403.5. Courts have gone so far as to hold that an urban renewal plan will be
valid even if its purpose is to make an area more aesthetically pleasing. Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
22. Cunningham, supra note 8. See also Webster Realty Co. v. City of Fort Dodge, 174
N.W.2d 413 (Iowa 1970); Wilson v. Iowa City, 165 N.W.2d 813 (Iowa 1969); R. & R. Welding
Supply Co. v, City of Des Moines, 256 Iowa 973, 129 N.W.2d 666 (1964). Each discusses and
upholds the constitutionality of the Urban Renewal Law. IOWA CODE ch. 403 (1977.
23. Id. § 403.5.
24. Dilley v. City of Des Moines, 247 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1976).
1977-19781
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Federal, state, and local levels of government also play significant
roles in the urban renewal system."5 Experience has demonstrated the ex-
istence of substantial problems at these various levels, including:
1. Lack of enabling legislation mandating adequate planning;
2. Lack of coordination of urban renewal with other urban assis-
tance programs provided by the federal government;
3. Urban renewal procedures, involving a minimum of two and
generally four federal agencies, as well as local public and other govern-
ment agencies, have become too complex and time consuming;
4. Attempts to comply with the "workable program" requirement
has demonstrated the difficulty of enforcing regulatory codes and or-
dinances;
5. Urban renewal is expensive;
6. The urban renewal concept from its inception has suffered from
fundamental disagreements at federal, state and local levels as to where
major emphasis should be placed."
These complex problems demand planning, as well as federal, state
and local coordination. Without such planning and coordination, the land-
25. The changing character of urban areas has brought with it unforeseen problems.
Relief from these problems was to come from state and federal assistance but was to be ad-
ministered locally. As industry and commerce move into and out of different urban
neighborhoods, different sections of a city are either adversely or beneficially affected. The
problems engendered by urban slums proved to be one of the major incentives for the urban
planning movement. First, housing and building codes were employed to promote safe and at-
tractive structures. Then public health and multiple-dwelling regulations were designed to
eliminate unsanitary conditions. During the Depression, provisions for public housing were
initiated for the purpose of making available homes for those unable to afford housing in the
private market. It was the federal government that provided the initial impetus through such
landmark legislation as the Emergency Relief and Construction Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (1932),
the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1934, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), and the Housing Act
of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-30 (1970).
The goal throughout this period was to cause a shift in the housing market from private
to public housing so as to provide an incentive for owners of substandard buildings to
renovate their properties for decent residential use or to convert them to other purposes.
Additional pressures were supplied by the many housing acts which provided for the elimina-
tion of one substandard unit for each public housing unit built. However, it was clear by the
beginning of World War II that this approach was inadequate. These economic factors proved
to be too costly and too slow-moving, and the demand for housing in many areas made slum
properties too valuable to preclude their elimination from the housing market. Thus, it was
within this setting that the concept of urban development began in New York in 1941. It was
the need to provide adequate housing that gradually caused the development of the land use
tool now known as urban renewal. Essentially, urban renewal calls for the governmental ac-
quisition of property by purchase or condemnation of designated slum or blighted areas.
These areas are then cleared or redeveloped; facilities, such as streets and utilities, are in-
stalled; and the area is resold or leased to private developers for redevelopment in accor-
dance with a plan designed to produce and maintain a decent and attractive urban area. Cun-
ningham, supra note 8, at 437-39.
26. Id. at 454-57. See Vestal, Planning For Urban Areas: The Fight for Coherency, 56
IOWA L. REV. 19 (1970).
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owner can be adversely affected by the fragmentation of federal, state
and local regulations. The emergence of the federal government into the
land use area, together with the seeming inability of local municipalities
to adequately coordinate disparate and fragmented units of authority, lead
to the issue of the feasibility of regional planning."
3. Subdivision Regulation
One, if not the most, localized land use control is subdivision regula-
tion governing the manner in which a parcel of land can be divided into
smaller units. Subdivision regulation is one of the key tools utilized effec-
tively and extensively at the local level. In Iowa, the key subdivision
regulation is established through the auspices of a recording statute.28
Land use controls are also found in the housing and building codes of a
given municipality.'
4. Environmental Controls
The final governmental land use control regulates environmental
quality." Although such controls exist more predominantly on the state
and federal levels than the local level, they nevertheless directly affect
land utilization."
In Iowa, the Department of Environmental Quality is charged with
the responsibility of overseeing commissions on air quality, water quality,
solid waste disposal and chemical technology.2 There is also established
27. D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLS LEGISLATION 11-14 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as MANDELKER].
The Iowa Supreme Court in Webster Realty Co. v. City of Fort Dodge, 174 N.W.2d 413
(Iowa 1970), while discussing the constitutionality of the Urban Renewal Law, IOWA CODE ch.
403 (1966), underscored the seriousness of the problem created by urban blight and noted
that the Urban Renewal Law is extraordinary in policy and purpose, and is aimed to relieve
pressing and urgent municipal evils.
28. IOWA CODE ch. 409 (1977). See also Note, Subdivision Regulation in Iowa, 54 IOWA
L. REV. 1121 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Subdivision Note].
29. IOWA CODE chs. 403A, 413 (1977). For an economic analysis of housing codes, see
Markovits, The Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency And Overall Desirability Of Ideal
Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1976).
30. In the near future a corpus of law relative to the competing demands for energy
usage will develop and will also contain land use ramifications-for example, the location of
energy facilities. See T. STOEL. ENERGY IN FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (E. Dolgin & T.
Gilbert eds. 1974); Note, Power Plant Siting-A Regulatory Crisis, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 645
(1973). Also, ii categorized as sui generis, agriculture law can be viewed as land use control.
See Symposium, Agricultural Law, 21 S.D.L. REV. 479 (1976); Symposium, Agricultural Law,
54 NEV. L. REV. 21 (1975); Symposium, Agricultural Law, N.D.L. REV. 249 (1974); Symposium,
Agriculture and the Law, 44 N.D.L. REV. 447 (1968).
31. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 27, at 1-15.
32. IOWA CODE ch. 455B (1977). See also Woodruff, Pollution Control Why Not Cost
Allocation?, 21 DRAKE L. REV. 133 (1971); Hines & Schantz, Water Quality Regulation Im-
provement In Iowa, 57 IOWA L. REV. 231 (1971).
1977-19781
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in Iowa the Iowa Natural Resources Council" for the conservation and
preservation of the surface and ground-water resources of the state.
On the federal level, principal statutes include: the National En-
vironmental Policy Act," Clean Air Act of 1970,' Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1 9 7 2 ,11 National Flood Insurance Program, 7
the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act' and the Coastal Zone Management Act."
Legislation has been introduced in Congress which would encourage and
support land use and management programs through a grant system ad-
ministered by the Secretary of the Interior.'
The above list of land use controls is to emphasize that the area of
land use is heavily regulated by all levels of government. With so many
regulations on so many levels, it is important to recognize that efficient
33. IOWA CODE ch. 455A (1977).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-61 (1970). The heart of NEPA is the environmental impact state-
ment required of developers. This Act has been viewed as a revolutionary development
and as a federalization of land use. See HAGMAN, supra note 19, at 527-54 (1971 & supp. 1975)
and F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1972). See
also Iowa Citizens in Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1973).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58a (Supp. VI 1976). See Bleicher, Economic And Technical
Feasibility In Clean Air Act Enforcement Against Stationary Sources, 89 HARV. L. REV. 316
(1975).
36. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975). See Goldfare, Water Quality Management
Planning: The Fate of 208, 8 U. TOL. L. REV. 105 (1976); Note, The EPA's Power To Establish
National Effluent Limitations for Existing Water Pollution Sources, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 120
(1976).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (Supp. V 1975).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1970).
39. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. V 1975). See generally NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE -
COUNCIL, INC., LAND USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES (1977) for a guide to the various
federal, state and local controls.
40. Since 1970 at least nine major comprehensive land use proposals have appeared in
one or both houses of Congress. In 1970, Senator Henry Jackson introduced S. 3354, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). A corresponding bill, H.R. 16.670 and 16.989, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970) was introduced in the House but never reached the floor.
Senator Jackson reintroduced the bill as S. 632, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) and it,
together with an administration bill, S. 992, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) passed the Senate.
The House took no action on S. 632 nor on its own H.R. 7211, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) was introduced by Senator Jackson and the ad-
ministration again offered a land use bill, S. 924, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). S. 268 passed the
Senate but died in the House while a bill introduced by Representative Udall was also being
considered, H.R. 10294, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); it too died in the House.
Finally, in the opening days of the 94th Congress, Senator Henry Jackson and
Representative Morris Udall again introduced S. 984, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) and H.R.
3510, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) respectively. Again, these measures failed. A brief
bibliography of congressional efforts in this area is given in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN-
STITUTE, LAND USE PROPOSALS (1975). See Land Resource Planning Assistance Act and The
Energy Facilities Planning and Development Act: Hearings on S. 984 and S. 619 before the
Subcommittee on the Environment and Land Resources Comm. of the Sen. Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, Parts 1 & 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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land use decisions will suffer unless an orderly and complementary
system of controls can be implemented as inexpensively as possible.
One alternative that has been widely discussed to cope with the
challenge of urban growth and increased governmental regulation is the
concept of regional planning.'1 Under this system, regional needs beyond
the border of a given municipality would not be ignored. Yet the issue
becomes whether the body politic is able and willing to create such a
system of regional planning, as the possibility exists that it could strip
the municipalities of their control over land use decisions. There does ex-
ist a middle ground, however, that regional planning need not destroy all
local authority; it is possible to implement regional planning and still
parcel out the responsibilities between the local and regional author-
ities.'2 This is a less drastic solution than either keeping the present
system intact or removing all authority from the local governments. The
middle ground permits the preservation of each unit's integrity. Once
there is a realization that the concept of regional planning will not
destroy local autonomy, then perhaps progress can be made in that direc-
tion. Regional planning theorists, ideally, seek efficiency-not the
establishment of a new bureaucracy. It is not a necessary corollary that
because a variety of controls exist at various regulatory levels that effi-
ciency cannot be achieved. Flexibility and efficiency in land use are two
goals that are realizable through any well thought-out system. This Arti-
cle will explore possible means of achieving these goals, and discuss
reasons why these theories can and should be pursued.
II. ZONING
A. Statutory Scheme
At the first city planning conference held in 1909, zoning received on-
ly passing attention. New York City is generally credited with having
41. See Haar, Regionalism And Realism In Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 515
(1957); Note, The Regional Approach to Planning, 50 IOWA L. REV. 582 (1965). Regionalism, as
used here, means regulation of land use beyond the local level: county, state or federal con-
trol. See Johnson, Land Use Planning and Control by the Federal Government, in No LAND IS AN
ISLAND 75 (1975); McClaughry, The New Federalism-State Land Use Controls, in No LAND IS
AN ISLAND 37 (1975); Udall, Land Use: Why We Need Federal Legislation, in No LAND IS AN
ISLAND 59 (1975). In terms of human interactions, urban areas are most directly affected by
poor planning. However, non-metropolitan areas cannot be ignored, particularly in a state
where farming is of primary significance. The wide range of controls and the diverse types of
land users require some system that will allow for uniformity, efficiency and flexibility. A
fragmented administrative structure is unable to efficiently and effectively meet the
demands created by the aforementioned regulations. This failure is due in part, if not
substantially, to either political inability or unwillingness to create a unified system of ad-
ministration that provides the needed uniformity and flexibility. The old system of land use
controls worked to create municipal fiefdoms not unlike the city states of ancient Greece or
Renaissance Italy. The result: balkanization of control and diseconomies in land use.
42. This is essentially the approach taken by the ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT
CODE (Prop. Off. Draft 1975) [hereinafter cited as MLDC].
1977-19781
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enacted the first comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1916, although cer-
tain restrictions pertaining to height and use had been enacted in various
cities prior to this time. Following 1916, planners across the country
began organizing and developing zoning ordinances. In 1922, the first
treatise on zoning, "The Law of City Planning and Zoning" by Frank B.
Williams, was published.' 3 However, the most significant event in this
early history of zoning was the development of the Standard State Zon-
ing Enabling Act (SZEA) drafted by the Department of Commerce under
Herbert Hoover." The SZEA was the foundation upon which rests most
state enabling acts of today, including Iowa's.' 5
A review of the SZEA illustrates how the laws of zoning and planning
developed in this country. Sections 1 and 2 of the SZEA set out the
powers of a municipality.
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general
welfare of the community, the legislative body of cities and incorporated
villages is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height, number
of stories, and the size of buildings and other structures, the percentage
of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open
spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of buildings,
structure's, and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes.
For any or all said purposes the local legislative body may divide the
municipality into districts of such number, shape, and area as may be
deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of this act; and within such
districts it may regulate and restrict the erection, construction,
reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings, structures, or land.
All such regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings
throughout each district, but the regulation in one district may differ
from those in other districts."
'
Utilizing hindsight, these two sections indicate the rigid districting
scheme which was to be the basic focus of municipal zoning. This created
a rigid grid system of zoning, the problems of which will be discussed at
a later point.'7
Similarities between the SZEA and the Iowa State Enabling Legisla-
tion can readily be seen as both the municipality and the county have
43. Cited in HAAR on PLANNING, supra note 1. Haar also includes a short bibliography
on the history of zoning. Id. at 185-87.
44. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (rev. ed. 1926)
[hereinafter cited as SZEA], reprinted in 3 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
100-1 to 100-6 (4th ed. 1975).
45. IOWA CODE ch. 414 (1977).
A more elaborate history of zoning in general may be found in 1 R. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 1.14, 3.07-.11 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]; 1 A.
RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §§ 1.01-.04 (4th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
RATHKOPF]; Cunningham, supra note 18, at 368-80.
46. SZEA §§ 1 and 2, supra note 44.
47. See Part IV infra.
[Vol. 27
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identical powers in terms of districting and rest their powers on policies
identical to those enumerated in the SZEA.'8
After setting out the powers and general policy, the SZEA establish-
ed the procedural mechanism for the implementation of these objectives.
Prior to the establishment of a zoning scheme"' or amendments to that
scheme," there must be a study and report by a body authorized to ex-
amine the zoning plan, after which the legislative body must hold public
hearings. 1 Once this is completed and a zoning plan has been adopted,
the heart of the SZEA-the Board of Adjustment-comes into play. This
board was created to act upon the inequities which result from the im-
position of government regulations on landowners.
The board has jurisdiction to hear appeals by any person aggrieved
by any municipal officer.2 Expressly inchided are the powers:
1. To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged there is error in any
order, requirement, decision, or determination made by administrative
official ....
2. To hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of the
ordinance ....
3. To authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance from the
terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest,
where, owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the
provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship, and so
that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial
justice done."
48. IOWA CODE ch. 414 and ch. 358A (1977) (§ 414 contains the enabling legislation for
municipalities and § 358A pertains to counties). See also Note, County Zoning in Iowa, 45
IOWA L. REV. 743 (1960). The corresponding sections for municipalities are Iowa Code §§
414.1, .2 and .3, and for counties, Iowa Code §§ 358A.3, .4 and .5 (1977). The county enabling
statute describes an additional power not set out in § 2 of the SZEA nor in its municipal
counterpart. The court may "regulate, restrict, and prohibit the use for residential purposes
of tents, trailers and portable . . . structures; provided that such powers shall be exercised
only with reference to land and structures located within the county but lying outside the
corporate limits of any city .. " IOWA CODE § 358A.3 (1977). This restriction could be utilized
to preclude the establishment of mobile home parks if the exclusion survives constitutional
attack. See Vickers v. Township Committee of Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, __, 181
A.2d 129, 140-50 (1962) (Hall, J., dissenting) (ordinance excluding mobile homes declared valid).
But see Dequindre Development Co. v. Charger Township, 359 Mich. 634, 103 N.W.2d 600
(1960) (ordinance excluding mobile homes held unreasonable); contra, Kirk v. Township of
Tyrone, 398 Mich. 429, 247 N.W.2d 848 (1976) (ordinance excluding mobile homes held valid).
See also Annot. 42 A.L.R.3d 598 (1972); Bartke & Gage, Mobile Homes: Zoning and Taxation,
55 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1970).
49. SZEA § 4, supra note 44.
50. I§5.
51. Id. § 6 (establishes zoning commission). Chapter 414 of the Iowa Code has adopted
almost verbatim the SZEA. IOWA CODE §§ 414.4-.6 (1977). Similarly, the counties have
authority to establish an identical mechanism. Id. §§ 358A.6-.8.
52. SZEA § 7, supra note 44.
53. Id. The board of adjustment created under the Iowa enabling legislation is
substantially the same in regard to powers and duties as that created under § 7 of the SZEA.
See IOWA CODE §§ 358A.15, 414.12 (1977).
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Finally, the SZEA sets out means of enforcement, including imprison-
ment, fines and other civil remedies." One additional means of enforce-
ment consists of granting to the city council or county board of adjust-
ment the authority to initiate legal actions to prevent the unlawful con-
struction, alteration, use or occupancy of any building, structure or land.'
B. Constitutional Basis
Historically, the constitutionality of zoning regulations was upheld on
a nuisance theory. However, use of the police power as the constitutional
authorization for zoning laws under the SZEA enables municipalities to
regulate on a broader scale without being confined to the nuisance con-
cept-that a landowner could do anything to his land as long as his
neighbors were not adversely affected. As long as a municipal decision is
in accordance with certain general guidelines, ie., promotive of health,
safety, morals or general welfare, a landowner's use of his land can
54. SZEA § 8, supra note 44. Compare IOWA CODE § 358A.26 (1977).
55. SZEA § 8, supra note 44. Compare IOWA CODE §§ 358A.23, 414.20 (1977). Unlike
the SZEA, the local boards of adjustment in Iowa are mandatory and are created by the
council, the local legislative body. IOWA CODE § 414.7 (1977). The county follows suit. I& §
358A.10. In addition, Iowa's enabling legislation for both municipalities and counties follows
the SZEA in establishing procedures whereby persons aggrieved by board of adjustment ac-
tion may seek review in the district court. Id. §§ 358A.18, 414.15. Courts are also given the
discretion to allow the board of adjustment to review its own initial decision within a time
period prescribed by the court. I& §§ 358A.19, 414.16. And courts can grant a restraining
order during this review, if necessary. Id. If the court decides a hearing is necessary, the
matter is to be tried de novo. Id §§ 358A.21, 414.18. The court may take evidence or appoint
a referee to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. A report will then be made by the
referee to the court, which will form the basis of the judge's decision. Id Remedial provisions
are also included:
In case any building or structure is erected, constructed, reconstructed,
altered, repaired, converted, or maintained; or any building, structure, or land is us-
ed in violation of this chapter or of any ordinance or other regulation made under
authority conferred thereby, the council [board of supervisors for county], in addi-
tion to other remedies, may institute any appropriate action or proceedings to pre-
vent such unlawful erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, conver-
sion, maintenance or use to restrain, correct, or abate such violation, to prevent the
occupancy of said building, structure, or land or to prevent any illegal act, conduct,
business, or use in or about such premises.
Id §§ 358A.23, 414.20. The enabling legislation also provides that in cases of conflict with
other rules, ordinances or statutes, the more restrictive land use control will govern. Id §§
358A.24, 414.21.
Insofar as municipal and county zoning does exist, the enabling legislation has given
the municipality the authority to zone the unincorporated areas up to two miles beyond the
limits of each city except for those areas within a county where a county zoning ordinance
exists. Id § 414.23. See also Louie Balk Lime & Ready-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Board of Adjust-
ment, 215 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1974). If a city chooses to exercise its authority it must then in-
crease the size of its planning and zoning commission and its board of adjustment to include
members residing in the area outside the city limits over which this jurisdiction is extended.
IOWA CODE § 414.23 (1977).
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be tightly circumscribed. Under the police power, these land uses have
been segregated into classes such as residential and commercial, by
means of comprehensive zoning.'
In 1917, prior to an enabling act, Iowa enacted its first land use
regulation-a procedure by which cities on petition of sixty per cent of
the owners of real estate in a district, could establish within its limits a
district restricted to residential use. 7 The constitutionality of this act
was upheld in City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co.5"
In the Manhattan Oil Co. case, the city brought suit to enjoin the
defendants from erecting and maintaining a gasoline station on property
owned by the defendant in a district restricted to residential use. The or-
dinance for this restriction was adopted pursuant to statute and any use
in violation thereof was declared a nuisance. The city contended that the
statute was a valid exercise of the police power, and the court upheld the
statute on this ground."
The ordinance was also challenged as taking private property for
public use without just compensation, a constitutional imperative."' The
court rejected the taking argument on the grounds that the regulation
did not deny the defendants the use of their. property and that it did not
take the defendants' property for the private use of the residents."1
Finally, the Iowa court considered whether the restriction of the or-
dinance upon the use of the property was so clearly unreasonable that it
would be held void. There were several challenges to the reasonableness
of the statute, including absence of notice, absence of a compensation pro-
56. See Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); ANDERSON, supra note 45, at §
3.06; RATHKOPF, supra note 45, at § 2.2. Whether or not this was the intent and purpose of
the act can be the subject of speculation; however, one must note that the purpose and inten-
tions of the SZEA are broadly established.
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and
designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and
other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light
and air; to prevent overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of popula-
tion; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage,
schools, parks, and other public requirements. Such regulation shall be made with
reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district and
its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value
of the buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such
municipality.
SZEA § 3, supra note 44.
57. 1917 IOWA ACTS ch. 138 (current version at IOWA CODE § 414.24 (1977)).
58. 193 Iowa 1096, 184 N.W. 823 (1921), sup. op., 193 Iowa 1096, 188 N.W. 921 (1922).
59. City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 1103-09, 184 N.W. 823,
826-29 (1921), sup. op., 193 Iowa 1096, 188 N.W. 921 (1922).
60. Id at 1106, 184 N.W. at 828. See IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 18 (1857, amended 1908).
Plaintiffs also argued that the construction of a gas station constituted a nuisance. City of
Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 1098, 184 N.W. 823, 824 (1921), sup. op., 193
Iowa 1096, 188 N.W. 921 (1922).
61. Id- at 1108-09, 184 N.W. at 829.
1977-19781
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vision and making a nuisance of an act that is otherwise lawful. The court
ruled against all challenges and held the ordinance to be reasonable:
[l]t is essential to peace, good order, and general welfare that the in-
dividual shall submit to reasonable restrictions upon his natural rights for
the public good; and it is not at all strange or unusual that he often finds
himself forbidden under penalty, to do things which, but for some police
regulation, would be his unquestionable right. Nor is it of'itself a valid ob-
jection to a police regulation that it is made applicable to a segregated
area or district....
That the state may directly, or through delegation of authority to
municipalities, adopt and enforce reasonable regulations concerning the
use and occupation of real estate in cities and towns is too well establish-
ed to admit of serious dispute."
Thus, the Manhattan Oil Co. case set the stage for the exercise of the
police power in the area of land use regulations prior to the enactment of
zoning enabling legislation.
This decision reflects the pattern of law that still exists today. A
municipality can regulate land use, including segregation of land uses ac-
cording to use and type of structure, pursuant to the police power
delegated by the state. This restricted residential district law is a
microcosm of the law of zoning and planning in the Unites States." By
far, most litigation and case law have developed over the issue of residen-
tial districting. In fact, housing and the preservation of single family
residential areas, whether it be from "apartment blight" or to preserve
the "small town" character of a given area, has been and continues to be
the history and development of land use planning."
62. Id. at 1110-11, 184 N.W. at 829. Prophetically, the court envisioned a day when ex-
pansion of the city's commercial area would crowd out the residents; the court said the validi-
ty of the restrictions could then be questioned. Id. at 1115, 184 N.W. at 831-32.
63. Many cases have dealt with controversies involving restricted residential districts.
See Funnell v. City of Clear Lake, 239 Iowa 135, 30 N.W.2d 722 (1948); Hirsch v. City of
Muscatine, 233 Iowa 590, 10 N.W.2d 71 (1943); Scott v. City of Waterloo, 223 Iowa 1169, 274
N.W. 897 (1937); Wolle v. Sioux City, 229 N.W. 214 (Iowa 1930) (not reported in Iowa
Reports); Marquis v. City of Waterloo, 210 Iowa 439, 228 N.W. 870 (1930); Downey v. Sioux
City, 208 Iowa 1273, 227 N.W. 125 (1929). See also 7 IOWA L. BULL. 260 (1921).
64. The current debate is the extent to which a city can go to preserve residential
character without being illegally exclusionary. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966)
(hereinafter cited as BABCOCK].
The celebrated case of Southern Burlington Co. NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), has entrenched
into land use literature the term exclusionary zoning. The constitutionality and validity of a
government regulation that has the effect of excluding certain classes of persons is perhaps
the hottest issue in zoning today. See Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d
765 (1970) (ordinance held invalid as exclusionary); National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn,
419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (ordinance held to be invalid as exclusionary); accord,
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977); Appeal
of Girsch, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). But see Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359,
[Vol. 27
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Thus, such exercise of power will be upheld unless it is so onerous as
to constitute a taking. 5 Furthermore, the exercise of power must be
reasonable."'
The next stage in the development of zoning authority in Iowa was
the enactment of the State Enabling Act in 1923. The constitutionality of
this enabling legislation was unsuccessfully challenged in Anderson v.
Jester.
67
In Anderson, a landowner applied to the building commissioner for a
permit to open a coal company within a residential zone. When the
building inspector refused to issue the permit, the coal company suc-
cessfully sought a variance from the Board of Adjustment. Neighboring
owners demanded a trial de novo to present evidence showingthat the
granting of the variance would not be in harmony with the general pur-
pose of the zoning ordinance but would be contrary to its spirit and the
public interest, that substantial justice would not be served, and that
denial of the permit would not result in an unnecessary hardship."
The court first discussed the constitutionality of Chapter 414, the
enabling statute, and upheld the ordinance on established authority.
Specifically, the court stated that it was a valid exercise of the police
power in the interest of the public peace, order, morals, health, safety,
comfort, convenience and general welfare. 9
Discussing the reasonableness of the zoning ordinance, the court
stated:
Classification or regulation will not be held arbitrary or unreasonable or
discriminatory unless clearly so . . . . All regulation imposes limitation
upon the full use and enjoyment of property, and in a sense takes away
property rights .... That full use and enjoyment of a plot of ground are
prohibited, that the excluded use is the most profitable to which the land
can be put, or that the prohibition deprives the owner of profit that would
otherwise be derived from such use, or that esthetic considerations in-
cidentally enter into the determinations does not invalidate the regulation
285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). See also Ellickson,
Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Ellickson].
65. For a discussion of when a governmental regulation becomes a taking, see, e.g.,
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1977); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public
Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
66. The concept of reasonableness raises the issue of substantive due process. See
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S.
183 (1928).
67. Anderson v. Jester, 206 Iowa 452, 221 N.W. 354 (1928).
68. Id at 455, 221 N.W. at 356.
69. Id. at 456, 221 N.W. at 356.
1977-1978]
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.... A district may be zoned as residential, and industrial enterprises ex-
cluded from it, though it is sparsely settled, and adopted for industrial
uses."0
Thus, Anderson merely built upon the existing precedent of Manhattan
Oil Co. in laying the ground rules for the exercise of zoning power by a
municipality.71
If forced to characterize the battle between a land user and govern-
mental regulation, one could quickly point to the fact that the land user
seeks to make a more profitable use of his property than is allowed by
the restriction imposed by a governmental entity. The ultimate concern
of the developer is that the value of his property will be lessened by
restricting the use which can be made of it. However, devaluation alone
is insufficient to overturn a land use restriction."
70. Id at 457-58, 221 N.W. at 357 (citations omitted). The court further discussed the
powers of a board of adjustment as set forth in Iowa Code ch. 6463 (1927). The court stated,
"The power [of the board of adjustment] may not be arbitrarily exercised, and its exel-cise
must be confined strictly within the limitations of the statute .... The reservation of this
power of variance and adjustment and the delegation thereof to a special board are not un-
constitutional." Anderson v. Jester, 206 Iowa 452, 459, 221 N.W. 354, 358 (1928).
71. The constitutionality of Iowa Code ch. 414 has been affirmed in McMahon v. City
of Dubuque, 255 F.2d 154 (8th Cir. 1958); Plaza Recreational Center v. Sioux City, 253 Iowa
246, 111 N.W.2d 758 (1961); Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 66 N.W.2d 113
(1954); Brackett v. City of Des, Moines, 246 Iowa 249, 67 N.W.2d 542 (1954); Boardman v.
Davis, 231 Iowa 1227, 3 N-W.2d 608 (1942).
A paradigm zoning case which examined in detail the various types of attacks which
can be levied at a zoning ordinance -s Plaza Recreational Center v. Sioux City, 253 Iowa 246,
111 N.W.2d 758 (1961). In Plaza Recreational a landowner operated a bowling alley as a per-
mitted use. However, zoning regulations applicable to the D-1 district in which the bowling
alley was located prohibited the consumption of beer on the premises. Thus, the landowner
attacked the ordinance on a number of grounds, including: it was unconstitutional (id. at 251,
111 N.W.2d at 762); it was a violation of the due process and equal protection laws of the
state and federal constitutions (id. at 252, 111 N.W.2d at 762); it was a violation of substan-
tive due process (id. at 253, 111 N.W.2d at 763); it was a taking (id at 254, 111 N.W.2d at
763-64); it was discriminatory (id. at 255, 111 N.W.2d at 764); and it violated the comprehen-
sive plan (id. at 257-5 111 N.W.2d at 765). The court rejected these contentions and held
that the plaintiff failed t( meet his burden in proving the unreasonableness of the ordinance.
Basically, Plaza Recreational dealt with a restriction upon the use of one's property;
however, the same and similar argL...ents occur when bulk restrictions are imposed. See,
e.g., Boardman v. Davis, 231 L 1227, 3 N.W.2d 608 (1942). The consequences of failing to
follow a bulk restriction can b, serious. In Boardman, the defendant was required to tear
down a partially constructed building. Id.
72. Numerous cases exist whereby a land use regulation precluded all use of an
owner's land. Some cases grant the landowner no relief. See Sibson v. State of New Hamp-
shire, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975); Just v. Marinette Co., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761
(1972). But see State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Petersen v. City of Decorah, 259
N.W.2d 553 (Iowa Ct. App. 1977) (failure of city to rezone property from agricultural zone to
allow for shopping center held confiscatory).
A popular term for such manuevering is called "down zoning" and it was this down zon-
ing that was the basis of the complaint in Business Ventures, Inc. v. Iowa City, 234 N.W.2d
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This brief review of the underlying analysis and constitutional
challenges is to establish the basis for land use regulations, ie., zoning.
The ensuing section will interrelate zoning with planning theories and
develop the case law of various zoning techniques and problems.
III. PLANNING
A. Definition
Logically, planning should have preceded zoning, as the latter is pro-
perly characterized as a planning tool. But historically the opposite is
true as planning legislation was enacted subsequent to zoning legislation.
In 1928, only two years after the SZEA, the Department of Commerce
promulgated the Standard City Planning Enabling Act."
Planning encompasses more than the location of physical structures
and establishment of segregated use districts, although these are deemed
to be the central goals of land use controls. In fact, to accomplish the pur-
poses of zoning, a plan necessarily depends upon environmental,
economic, sociological and political factors, in addition to the physical
nature of land. As the plan is carried out through land use controls, the
pace, sequence, timing and manner of land development is affected.
However, earlier zoning ordinances were developed merely by an ex-
amination of what uses were existing and by then mapping out districts
to fit the existing land uses. Thus, planning input was generally nonexis-
tent, and at most, negligible.
Today, planning may be characterized as the establishing of socio-
economic goals, examining available resources and devising a means
through which the goals can be achieved. The expectations and aspira-
tions of municipal officials and the citizenry play a significant, if not con-
trolling, part in this development. By selective allocation of municipal ser-
vices and facilities, a town can significantly control its character." The ur-
376 (Iowa 1975). Business Ventures is an example of a rather sophisticated attempt by a
municipality to down zone property which was to be taken by the city under its eminent do-
main power, thereby reducing considerably the cost of condemnation. Although Business
Ventures is essentially an eminent domain case, it illustrates well the crux of the zoning
issue-whether or not a governmental regulation unreasonably restricts the value of one's
property. If so, that regulation must fail. See Linowes & Delaney, Down Zoning-And How
the Landowner May Fight It, 5 REAL EST. L.J. 311 (1977). Implicit in this discussion is the
concept that landowners have a legally protected right to develop their property. Whether
there exists an a priori right to maximize the profit potential of one's land is an open ques-
tion. For discussion of a limited right to develop, see, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 64, at 416-18.
73. ANDERSON, supra note 45, at §§ 1.03-.11. See N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANN-
ING LAW § 18.1 (1975). The term planning is not used at this point as a term of art, but
rather, it has a generic meaning which transcends a given definition unless it is defined in a
statute or ordinance. ANDERSON, supra note 45, at § 1.03.
74. RATHKOPF, supra note 45, at 1-17 to 1-18. The wisdom of suburban growth controls
from an economic efficiency standpoint as well as from a legal standpoint is questioned in
Ellickson, supra note 64.
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ban planner must consider not only the physical and economic factors but
also human and sociological elements."5
To the land use lawyer, however, a more narrow definition of plan-
ning is generally employed, ie., does a particular land use regulation fit
an overall scheme or plan? 6
B. Statutory Scheme
In Iowa, the role of planning is manifest in the enabling legislation.
The planning process can take place in at least three municipal bodies.
First, the legislation provides a procedure for the establishment of
metropolitan or regional planning commissions.7 Second, the zoning com-
mission of a particular municipality is required to engage in the planning
process. 8 Finally, planning is mandated of the urban renewal agency.
The metropolitan regional commission is a vehicle for regional plan-
ning of two or more cities or counties. This commission is empowered to
perform regional planning of a comprehensive nature."9 However, due to
the permissive nature of the regional planning commission, there has
been a tendency to keep this power hidden and unused. With the present
need for regional planning, however, this is a potentially beneficial provi-
sion.
Prior to 1975, the legislature additionally provided for a city planning
commission. ° The commission was also permissive and was formed "[f]or
the purpose of making a comprehensive plan for the physical develop-
75. The courts have recognized an expansive interpretation of the planning function:
Planning is comprehended in this inherent right of sovereignty so to order the
affairs of the people as to serve the common essential need; and zoning is an im-
plementation of planning, concerned as it is with common social and economic in-
terests and needs encompassed by the basic power of government to "make, ordain
and establish all manner of wholesome and of reasonable laws, not repugnant to the
constitution," as may be deemed to be "for the good and welfare of the com-
monwealth and all subjects of the same."
Roselle v. Wright, 21 N.J. 400, -, 122 A.2d 506, 510 (1956). The planner as an advocate in-
volves the professional in these socio-economic issues. See, e.g., HAGMAN. supra note 19, at §
4; D. MAZZIOTTI. ADVOCACY PLANNING: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1972); Davidoff, Advocacy
and Pluralism in Planning, 31 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 331 (1965); Davidoff & Davidoff, Subur-
ban Action. Advocate Planning for an Open Society, 36 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 12 (1970).
76. Lawyers are increasingly being called upon to assimilate principles from other
)disciplines. In this instance, the lawyer as planner creates an interdisciplinary atmosphere
within which the lawyer must operate. The ability to synthesize a client's land use problems
from other than a purely legal standpoint should serve the attorney well. See generally D.
HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND DEVELOPMENT 346-80 (1973).
77. IOWA CODE §§ 473A.1-.8 (1977).
78. Id. §§ 414.6, 358A.8.
79. Id. § 473A.4.
80. IOWA CODE ch. 373 (1971) (repealed 64th G.A., ch. 1088, § 199, effective July 1,
1975). The repeal of this section may have serious consequences. The municipality can still
create such an agency, but the impetus to do so has been taken away.
[Vol. 27
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ment of the municipality.""1 With the present increased reliance on the
planning function, it is anomalous that the city planning commission
statute has been repealed with no assurance that the planning function
will be undertaken by another agency. While existing planning agencies
may continue to function,82 in those municipalities that never established
such a commission, there is no direct authorization now to do so."
Municipal and county enabling legislation requires that zoning be in
"accordance with a comprehensive plan."'" Failure to meet this man-
datory provision will result in an overturning of the zoning ordinance.
Additionally, before an urban renewal project is undertaken, a municipali-
ty must approve a "general plan for the municipality."" However, the Ur-
ban Renewal Law is not confined to specific urban renewal projects and
gives to a municipality a more general planning authority.
For [urban renewal purposes] and other municipal purposes, authority
is hereby vested in every municipality to prepare, to adopt and to revise
from time to time, a general plan for the physical development of the
municipality as a whole, giving due regard to the environs and
metropolitan surroundings."
C. Case Law
While the enabling legislation states that a comprehensive plan is
mandatory, the exact perimeters of what consititues a comprehensive
plan are not easily definable. 7 A general definition was set out in a New
Jersey case:
Without venturing an exact defintion it may be said for the present pur-
poses that "plan" connotes an integrated product of a rational process and
"comprehensive" requires something beyond a piece-meal approach, both
to be revealed by the ordinance considered in relation to the physical
facts and the purposes authorized by [the statute].'
The New Jersey court concluded that a zoning ordinance itself would con-
81. Id § 373.18.
82. IOWA CODE § 392.1 (1977).
83. Although the grant of home rule powers enables a city to create, almost without
limitation, administrative agencies, id. § 392.1, there is no guarantee, or even encouragement,
for the creation of a planning agency. This is an especially curious situation when the idea of
mandatory planning is considered. See generally, Mandelker, The Role of the Local Com-
prehensive Plan in Land use Regulation 74 MICH. L. REV. 900 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Mandelker on Comprehensive Plan].
84. IOWA CODE §§ 414.3, 358A.5 (1977).
85. Id. § 403.5(1).
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. See ANDERSON, supra note 45, at §§ 5.01-.07; RATHKOPF, supra note 45, at 12-1 to
12-6; HAAR, "In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955).
88. Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 166, 131 A.2d 1, 7 (1957).
1977-1978]
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stitute the comprehensive plan as long as it was the end product of a ra-
tional process, ie., a study. 9
Because of increased urbanization and growth, public concern with
issues such as growth management, environmental protection and the
need for the provision of low-income housing have added new dimensions
to the planning process and have imparted an urgency on local com-
prehensive planning that was not felt earlier.
As a result of the increased need for planning and the statutory re-
quirement of a comprehensive plan, courts" and legislatures91 have imposed
even greater planning requirements on municipalities. One of the
responses to this urgency for a comprehensive plan is the concept of a
"master plan"-the requirement of a general plan for a given area. Yet,
while the master plan concept may satisfy the comprehensive plan re-
quirement, it is not necessary or as of yet feasible that the master plan
be adopted by all municipalities. However, there is a general trend in
some states towards requiring a master plan-which by its nature is com-
prehensive. More frequently the judiciary is looking to the comprehen-
sive and master plan requirements in order to test a zoning ordinance
against a reasonable set of studies and assumptions.2 There is no master
plan requirement in Iowa. Here, reference to the master plan concept is
made only to highlight how a municipality may satisfy the comprehensive
plan requirement.
89. Id. at 167-68, 131 A.2d at 7-8. Hence, the requirement of a comprehensive plan is a
standard against which a zoning ordinance must be measured; if the ordinance does not
satisfy this requirement then it is invalid.
Such being the requirements of a comprehensive plan, no reason is perceived why
we should infer the Legislature intended by necessary implication that the com-
prehensive plan be portrayed in some physical form outside the ordinance itself. A
plan may readily be revealed in an end-product-the zoning ordinance-and no
more is required by the statute.
The comprehensive plan embraced by an original zoning ordinance is of course
mutable. If events should prove that the plan did not fully or correctly meet or an-
ticipate the needs of the total community, amendments may be made . . . and if the
ordinance as thus amended reveals a comprehensive plan, it is of no moment that
the new plan so revealed differs from the original one.
Id at 166-67, 131 A.2d at 7-8 (citations omitted).
Insofar as zoning preceded planning, this historical fact has led to this type of judicial
justification in order to preserve the well accepted tradition of Euclidian zoning. The plan
has also been equated with the zoning map. Albright v. Town of Manlius, 34 App. Div. 2d
419, 422-23, 312 N.Y.S.2d 13, 18-19 (1970).
90. Baker v. City of Milwaukee, __ Ore. __ , 533 P.2d 772 (Ore. 1975); Fasano v.
Board of Co. Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 547, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
91. MANDELKER, supra note 27, at 31-32, 404-06.
92. See generally, MLDC, supra note 42, art. 3; ANDERSON, supra note 45, at §§
21.03-.15; HAAR ON PLANNING 996-1018, supra note 1; Haar, The Master Plan: An Imperma-
nent Constitution, 2q LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 353 (1955); Mandelker on Comprehensive Plan,
supra note 83.
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Iowa case law dealing with comprehensive plans is in agreement with
the general law that the comprehensive planning requirement is designed
to avoid piecemeal zoning. In Brackett v. City of Des Moines,9" the plain-
tiff landowner was granted a building permit for a commercial establish-
ment on his property. A subsequent zoning ordinance was passed rezon-
ing plaintiff's property from commercial to residential use and the
building permit was revoked. Plaintiff brought an action seeking a
declaration that the zoning ordinance was invalid and sought to enjoin its
enforcement. The court held that the ordinance was valid and that it was
promulgated in accordance with the "comprehensive plan."
[TJhe record shows the City Planning and Zoning Commission, over a
period of years had done much work on a comprehensive city plan. In
1938 . . . city planners, engineers and landscape architects [made]. .. a
comprehensive survey of the city and in 1940 [they made] a detailed
report in book form with many maps and plats .... Subsequently general
studies and studies on various sections and neighborhoods, including the
property, and neighborhood here involved, were made. These formed the
basis for changes in and additions to the comprehensive plan which
brought it up to date. Ordinance 54533 was based upon this new com-
prehensive plan. Public hearings were held for consideration of the pro-
posed ordinance....
[Tihere was full compliance with the requirement the regulations be
made in accordance with a comprehensive plan."
Similarly, in Plaza Recreational Center v. Sioux City," when a land-
owner attacked the use restriction on its property, the court sustained
the validity of the amended ordinance and noted: "If trends and economic
changes of the times appear, the council's discretion to change its plan is
quite broad and it may amend the general ordinance any time it deems
circumstances and conditions warrant such action." '
Finally, in Anderson v. City of Cedar Rapids,7 the Supreme Court of
Iowa, in sustaining a challenge to an amendment to a zoning ordinance
authorizing construction of a shopping center, discussed the need for flex-
ibility in a comprehensive plan: "It is not only proper but highly essential
that our municipality officials periodically review and update zoning
regulations. Welfare of the people, present and future, will not permit
adoption of a passive attitude in these matters." 8
93. 246 Iowa 249, 67 N.W.2d 542 (1954).
94. Brackett v. City of Des Moines, 246 Iowa 249, 257, 67 N.W.2d 542, 546 (1954).
95. 253 Iowa 246, 111 N.W.2d 758 (1961).
96. Plaza Recreational Center v. Sioux City, 253 Iowa 246, 258, 111 N.W.2d 758, 766
(1961).
97. 168 N.W.2d 739 (Iowa 1969).
98. Anderson v. City of Cedar Rapids, 168 N.W.2d 739, 743 (Iowa 1969).
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In these cases there exists, in capsule form, the law of the com-
prehensive plan with its varying facets. First, the comprehensive plan is
not much more than what it was in the Brackett case, ie., the existing
zoning ordinance. Then, in Anderson, the comprehensive plan is shown to
require flexibility so that development may be facilitated. Anderson is
also notable for its link between the past and present, particularly in
light of the far-reaching implications of City of Des Moines v. Manhattan
Oil Co.," in that physical and social need must be taken into account
when land use controls are implemented.
Although the case law does not present overly stringent planning re-
quirements and a flexible statutory scheme does exist, the Iowa law of
planning has its short-comings. First, there may not be sufficient enabling
legislation to encourage, if not force, new municipalities to establish plan-
ning commissions. Secondly, Iowa may fall victim to that which at least
one author feels all planning suffers- lack of mandatory planning re-
quirements:
Time has revealed that the decision of the model planning act drafts-
man to make the planning function optional was as serious a shortcoming
as their more widely recognized failure to call explicitly for a comprehen-
sive plan in zoning administration. Whatever reason for the absence of a
planning requirement there may have been, it is now apparent that
changes in land use control techniques, expansion in the scope of com-
prehensive planning, and an increasing emphasis on mandatory planning
in federal aid programs all underscore the need for mandating a com-
prehensive planning process at the local government level.
Since adoption of the comprehensive or master plan in 1955, noticeable
changes have taken place in the south-easterly part of Cedar Rapids. As a result of
relatively recent migrations, territory located within existing boundaries, once
denominated argicultural, has become residential. Concurrently the residential
population in that area south and east of the subject rezoned tract has increased
substantially.
Moreover, common experience discloses highly concentrated stores and shops,
catering to public needs, are often a convenience, if not a necessity, in or near
populous residential areas. Municipal planning in that direction cannot ordinarily be
held incompatible with any previously enacted comprehensive plan.
But that situation is not present in the case at bar. Here the rezoned property
is adjacent to an existing commercial district. A uniform development plan to im-
prove the property by permitting establishment of a shopping center, with controll-
ed traffic access and off-street parking, was duly approved by the city authorities.
As previously indicated the now constructed center provides, among other things, a
drive-in banking office. It is contemplated use of this and other available facilities
by those living in the vicinity will lessen traffic congestion in the central business
district. Other benefits to the people may reasonably be expected to flow from
establishment of the subject shopping district.
Id. at 743, 744 (citations omitted).
99. 193 Iowa 1096, 184 N.W, 823 (1921), sup. op., 193 Iowa 1096, 188 N.W. 921 (1922).
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Mandatory comprehensive planning is sorely needed to rationalize
public decisions to restrict or intensify development, so that a proper
balance can be struck between the needs of the public and the desires of
landowners as affected by these decisions.
State legislators must settle at least three major issues if they decide
to mandate comprehensive planning: the form and content of the planning
process to be required at different governmental levels within the state,
the extent to which consistency should be required between local land use
controls and locally adopted comprehensive plans, and the extent to which
local planning programs should be subject to review and modification by
other governmental units.'O
There are multifarious land use controls at numerous governmental
levels. If the system is to act efficiently, planning should be mandatory.
This additional expenditure of time and dollars should result in planned
growth for efficient future development.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUCLIDIAN ZONING IN IOWA
A. The Parameters of Euclidian Zoning
Euclidian zoning derives its name from Village of Euclid v. Amber
Realty Co., '' which upheld in principle the theory of zoning-districting
through the establishment of use and area districts, and height re-
quirements. This rigid districting system is the main characteristic of
Euclidian zoning.
The early champions of zoning acted on the assumption that owners
and occupiers of urban land should be protected from the injurious effects
of discordant land uses by segregating different types of use in separate
zones or districts. They also aimed to prevent the worst effects of uncon-
trolled urban growth by establishing reasonable standards of population
density, light, air, and open-space. The ideal city was viewed as a great
patchwork of contrasting zones rigidly segregating incompatible land
uses, each zone furnished the appropriate density, light, and air, and open-
space regulations, all "in accordance with a comprehensive plan."
The "Euclidian" zoning ideal just described rested upon the assump-
tions "that similar uses naturally tend to congregate in homogenous [sic]
areas, that development takes place lot-by-lot on small parcels, that shifts
of social groups and land values come about slowly, and that where and
when and how development takes place can be predicted and regulated in
advance." With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to see that many of
these assumptions were either questionable or clearly erroneous.'
Further, Euclidian zoning is not done in a comprehensive fashion
but merely by examining the existing land uses. Existing differences in
100. Mandelker on Comprehensive Plan, supra note 83, at 909-51 (footnotes omitted).
101. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
102. Cunningham, supra note 8, at 382-83 (footnotes omitted).
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land uses are thus emphasized and segregated rather than there being a
focus on interrelationships between different land users. This method il-
lustrates a lack of planning and instead facilitates prezoning planning.
However, the Euclidian ideal and the basic zoning authority in general,
ie., that police power, are not compatible. The police power is used
by the state to promote the general welfare while Euclid and its pro-
geny'"3 stress the goal of segregated districts, particularly segregated
residential districts of single-family detached dwellings.
Tension occurs as a result of the municipality's desire for self-
preservation and the state's larger desire to provide for the general
welfare. Many communities preserve their existing character by zoning
out users of non-single-family detached dwellings. It is difficult to justify
the segregation of single-family detached units let alone the exclusion of
two-family detached dwellings, townhouses and garden apartments. It is
difficult for a municipality to justify the creation of different minimum
standards designed to secure adequate light, air, and open space in dif-
ferent residential zones, as opposed to a single maximum standard for the
whole city. It is even more problematic for a municipality to try to justify
minimum lot-size requirements of e.g., more than one-half acre under any
circumstance. It appears that justification on health, safety or morals
grounds is untenable, and justification on the basis of the general welfare
is equally spurious."'
By analyzing growth patterns and avoiding overzoning, it is possible
to lessen this tension. For example, if a municipality attracts large scale
commercial and industrial development but only provides districts of
single-family detached dwellings, it is only accommodating housing for
middle and upper levels of management. Without complementary housing
for all employees, the municipality is overzoned for commercial and in-
dustrial uses."0 5
103. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The fundamental premises of Euclid and Nectow are as valid
today, perhaps unfortunately so, as when they were decided. In Euclid, zoning was upheld as
a valid exercise of the police power. The United States Supreme Court held the ordinance
constitutional on its face and procedurally did not require the challenger to exhaust its ad-
ministrative remedies. However, the Court reserved the issue of whether or not the or-
dinance as applied was valid. The latter issue, which requires that administrative remedies
be exhausted, was reached in Nectow. In Nectow, the Court adopted the findings in part of a
Special Master who noted that as applied to the land in question, the ordinance did not pro-
mote the general welfare. But see Southern Burlington City NAACP v. Township of Mt.
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
104. See Cunningham, supra note 8, at 385.
105. Id at 385-86. One rationale for overzoning is undoubtedly economic: a municipality
can broaden its tax base by bringing in business and industry. The countervailing desire to
preserve its residential character, however, may cause diseconomies. Because each broad
category of uses places a different strain on municipal facilities and services the above may
not be found to be compatible without provision for intermediate density uses. Municipalities
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The rigid districting of Euclidian zoning does not solve new problems,
however, such as competing land uses, the interrelatedness of land use
controls and the growth of industry and technology. One of the more re-
cent responses to this criticism of Euclidian zoning is judicial approval of
a planned unit development (P.U.D.).
P.U.D. is the antithesis of the exclusive districting principle which is
the mainstay of "Euclidian" zoning. The latter approach divided a com-
munity into districts, and explicitly mandated segregated uses. P.U.D., on
the other hand, is an instrument of land use control which augments and
supplements existing master plans and zoning ordinances, and permits a
mixture of land uses on the same tract (i.e. residential, commercial and in-
dustrial). It also enables municipalities to negotiate with developers con-
cerning proposed uses, bulk, density and set back zoning provisions, which
may be contrary to existing ordinances if the planned project is determin-
ed to be in the public and individual homeowner's interest. It also
recognizes the importance of encouraging and making it financially worth-
while for developers and investors to undertake P.U.D. projects by per-
mitting a more intensified utilization of vacant land which is scarce and
skyrocketing in price.'O'
The by-products of Euclidian zoning such as abuse of the variance pro-
cess, over-zoning and the failure to promote planning flexibility will be
explored in the remainder of this section.
B. Spot Zoning
Spot zoning is a term which generally describes the practice whereby
a single lot owner is granted privileges which are not granted to other
landowners. It can result in piecemeal zoning or a zoning decision which
is arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory with respect to a particular
parcel of property.' °7 The fact that a particular zoning decision, be it an
amendment, a re-zoning or variance, favors a particular parcel or owner
and is contrary to a comprehensive plan could arguably occur in any
system of zoning. This practice, where a zoning administrator will grant a
privilege to a parcel of land or an owner, is a by-product of Euclidian zon-
ing.
The fact that a particular parcel of land is treated differently is insuf-
ficient to establish spot zoning. It must also be shown that the resulting
pattern is not in accordance with the comprehensive plan.
Keller v. City of Council Bluffs"8 is a perfect example of the analysis
with antiquated zoning laws now find themselves in need of new techniques, e.g., tax incen-
tive zoning, upzoning, growth management, etc., to remedy the consequences of these
disparities.
106. Rudderow v. Township Committee, 121 N.J. Super. 409, __, 297 A.2d 583, 585
(1972). See also Elliott & Marcus, From Euclid to Ramapo: New Directions in Land Develop-
ment Controls, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 56 (1973).
107. ANDERSON. supra note 45, at §§ 5.08-.19; RATHKOPF. supra note 45, at 26-1 to 26-2.
108. 246 Iowa 202, 66 N.W.2d 113 (1954).
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used by a landowner who claims that a zoning decision constitutes spot
zoning. The landowners in Keller sought to test the validity of an amend-
ment to a comprehensive zoning ordinance which changed the use
classification of three lots from an "A" residential to a "B" residenti..
district. The "A" district allowed for single-family detached dwellings;
the "B" district allowed for the operation of a nursing home. The owners
of the lots in issue had, prior to the zoning ordinance, operated the
premises as a convalescent home. Consequently, it was a nonconforming
use. As a result of plaintiffs' complaints, the owners of the nursing home
sought rezoning which would make the nursing home a conforming use.
The rezoning was granted.' The plaintiffs appealed the decision claiming
it constituted illegal spot zoning, and this contention was upheld by the
district court. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed. The plaintiffs contend-
ed that this amendment was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, and
amounted to spot zoning and thus not in accordance with the comprehen-
sive plan. The defendants contended that the structure as located had lit-
tle or no value as a single-family dwelling and the only beneficial use to
be made was as a nursing home, an apartment house, fraternity or other
multi-dwelling all of which were prohibited in a class "A" district. This
contention was supported by facts. The court first noted that the rezoned
premises were never used as a single-family residence prior to the zoning
ordinance and that plaintiffs purchased and improved their property
knowing the use defendants made of their property. The rec6rd also
disclosed that there had been fifty amendments to the comprehensive
zoning ordinance, ten of which were from "A" to "B" and that this was
the only convalescent home in a class. "A" district of the' twelve
throughout the city.
The court further concluded that to deny relief would be against the
general welfare by rendering the property virtually valueless, un-
marketable and thus subject to decay."0 The court then addressed the
plaintiffs' argument that an amendment to an ordinance which zones a
property class "B" when it is entirely surrounded by class "A" is invalid
as spot zoning.
Action of imposing restrictions that do not bear alike on all persons living
in the same territory under similar conditions and circumstances is
discriminatory and will not be upheld .... That a zoning statute must be
impartially applied as to all properties similarly situated is beyond
dispute. Here, as we have pointed out, the property is not similarly
109. Rezoning to make a nonconforming use conforming is against the theory behind a
comprehensive plan.
110. Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 209, 66 N.W.2d 113, 117 (1954). If
this were the court's only concern there would appear to be no reason why the law of non-
conforming uses should not pertain, i.e., allow reasonable repairs without allowing expansion at
least until the landowner makes a reasonable return on his investment.
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situated and is distinguishable by its past use and character from other
surrounding property ...
"Spot zoning" when construed to mean reclassification of one or more
like tracts or similar lots for a use prohibited by the original zoning or-
dinance and out of harmony therewith is illegal. When done under certain
other conditions and circumstances in accordance with a comprehensive
zoning plan, such action will not be declared void. It depends upon the cir-
cumstances of each case ...
[Tihere must be substantial and reasonable grounds or basis for the
discrimination, when one lot or tract is singled out in an amendatory or-
dinance removing therefrom restrictions imposed upon the remaining por-
tions . . . of the same zoning district. When the tract has been shown to
be clearly different in character or use from those around it, discrimina-
tion may be legally justified."
A contrary result was reached in Hermann v. City of Des Moines 22
where plaintiffs attacked an amendment to a zoning ordinance on the
theory that the amendment constituted spot zoning in that it rezoned a
portion of property from R-2 (one and two-family dwellings) to R-3 (multi-
residence district). The facts, which were stipulated, indicated that the
premises in question would be an "R-3 island entirely surrounded by
R-2.... 3 The Hermann court noted that in Keller the property could not be
utilized in accordance with its zoning, unlike the present case. The pro-
perty here was similar in use, character and adaptability to the surroun-
ding property. It was used as a one-family dwelling at the time the or-
dinance was enacted. Finally, the court stated that there was no change
in the surrounding properties since the enactment of the general or-
dinance. '
The~property was intended to be used as a sorority house in the
vicinity of Drake University. However, the majority opinion held that
these facts were not stipulated and it would not take judicial notice of
them. It was on this ground the dissent held that the Des Moines City
111. Id at 213-14, 66 N.W.2d at 120.
112. 250 Iowa 1281, 97 N.W.2d 893 (1959).
113. Hermann v. City of Des Moines, 250 Iowa 1281, 1284, 97 N.W.2d 893, 895 (1959).
We are unable to find anything in the rezoning of a part of Lot 10 which will in any
way promote the public health, morals, safety or general welfare. It must be kept
in mind the comprehensive zoning ordinance, enacted in 1953, placed this lot in R-2,
together with all territory immediately surrounding it. No reason appears, none is
suggested, why this tract should now be singled out for removal of many of the
restrictions originally placed upon it and which still affect the remainder of the pro-
perty in the block. It is spot zoning; and while not all spot zoning is illegal per se,
the courts look upon it with some disfavor. This, of course, arises from the nature
of things. Properly, it is held that one property owner should not be favored over
his neighbors in the absence of a good reason therefore.
Id. at 1285, 97 N.W.2d at 895 (1959).
114. Id at 1287, 97 N.W.2d at 897.
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Council had not acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious matter
in adopting the amendment.'
The Keller and Hermann cases indicate the courts' difficulties in
resolving zoning problems. It is clear that the legislative body has great
discretion in designing the zoning ordinance and amendments. Additional-
ly, one who challenges a zoning ordinance has an onerous burden in over-
coming its presumption of validity. Given this presumption of validity
coupled with the municipality's wide discretion, a court can sustain a zon-
ing ordinance with little showing on behalf of the municipality as was the
result in Keller. Thus, it is notable that in Hermann the court did over-
turn the zoning ordinance on the basis that it constituted spot zoning."'
115. A reading -of the case indicated a paucity of evidence introduced on behalf of the
parties. Clearly a different result could be obtained given a better factual development:
There are several decisive elements in the instant case which show the basis of
the council action to be logical and reasonable, and which negative the action of the
city to be arbitrary, etc.: (1) The ordinance amendment creates no damage as to
general conditions in the neighborhood. (2) There is no prejudice nor damage to pro-
perty of plaintiffs, who are neighbors in the community. (3) The general welfare in
this area and the community is enhanced.
Id. at 1290, 97 N.W.2d at 899 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
The rule that amendments must not constitute spot zoning applies to counties as well.
See Keppy v. Ehlers, 253 Iowa 1021, 115 N.W.2d 198 (1962).
116. Hermann v. City of Des Moines, 250 Iowa 1281, 97 N.W.2d 893 (1959). See also
Keppy v. Ehlers, 253 Iowa 1021, 115 N.W.2d 198 (1962) wherein the rezoning of a 20 acre
tract from rural to light industrial in the area of a highway interchange was declared to be il-
legal spot zoning:
In Hermann v. City of Des Moines, 250 Iowa 1281, 97 N.W.2d 893, we had a
somewhat similar situation except it dealt with city zoning. We there held that a ci-
ty council does not have authority to amend a comprehensive zoning law so as to
remove or impose less onerous restrictions upon a small tract or lot similar in
character and use to the surrounding property. That restrictions not bearing alike
on all persons living in the same territory and under similar conditions and cir-
cumstances is discriminatory and will not be upheld. The better rule is that there
must be substantial and reasonable grounds or basis for the discrimination, when
one lot or tract is singled out in an amendatory ordinance removing therefrom
restrictions imposed upon the remaining portions of the same zoning district. See
Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 66 N.W.2d 113, 51 A.L.R.2d 251.
We feel it must be recognized that in county zoning a more complex question
is presented in dealing with agricultural lands, with the wide open spaces, than in
the more congested urban communities. We realize the change in conditions in the
vicinity of the new interchange creates a reason for a reclassification in this area.
But where it appears, as it does here, that such reclassification is largely dependent
upon an application being made as to a certain tract, without regard to other tracts
in the same area, similar in location to interchange; similar in adaptability to either
rural or light industry use; and similar in value, it must be said that the plan is evi-
dent of a lack of a comprehensive plan within the purview of the statute. While the
size of the tract involved is not too material it is of primary importance whether
such tract has a peculiar adaptability or is merely carved out of a similar tract or
area equally suited to the requested reclassification. Such is the situation here and
results in illegal "spot zoning.
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In Jaffe v. City of Davenport,"7 an action in equity was brought at-
tacking the validity of an amendatory ordinance which changed a portion
of a tract zoned R-5 (single family) to C-1 (neighborhood shopping district).
The district court declared the amendment void, but the Iowa Supreme
Court held that the amendment was not unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, even though it did constitute spot zoning. In support of its
decision, the court noted that the tract was such that it could only be us-
ed for truck farming, that it was located at a busy intersection controlled
by traffic lights in a fast growing, undeveloped and old residential area,
and that it was difficult to sell the land for residences at this location.
The fact that the rezoning may create an isolated area of particular
land use is not of itself necessarily illegal:
If the ordinance constitutes piece-meal or haphazard zoning of a small
tract of land similar in character and use to the surrounding property for
the benefit of the owner and not pursuant to a comprehensive plan for the
general welfare of the community, it is arbitrary, unreasonable and in-
valid.
Spot zoning is valid if it is germane to an object within the police power
and there is a reasonable basis for making this distinction between the
spot zoned and the surrounding property. The determination of this ques-
tion is primarily a legislative matter and is largely within the zoning
authority's -discretion.
The size of the spot zoned, the uses of the surrounding property, the
changing conditions of the area, the use to which the subject party has
been put and its suitability and adaptability for various uses are all mat-
ters to be considered in determining whether there is a reasonable basis
for singling out certain property from the neighboring property....
Zoning is not static and any existing restrictions are subject to reasonable
revision as the need appears and the ordinances may be amended any
time circumstances and conditions warrant such action.'18
The court went on to declare the ordinance valid insofar as the rezon-
ed property was a tract of over two acres, located at the intersection of
two heavily travelled thoroughfares. The court noted that the population
in the area had increased and the development trend was expected to
continue. In light of these facts, it found that the area was underzoned.
Additionally, the court found that witnesses for both sides agreed
that the tract was most suitable for commercial development. The court
said that the amendment constituted spot zoning, but since it was a
reasonable basis for the differentiation, that it would be upheld since the
We hold the amendment in question is discriminatory between citizens owning
similar tracts of land and is illegal.
Id. at 1023-24, 115 N.W.2d at 200 (citations omitted).
117. 179 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa 1970),
118. Jaffe v. City of Davenport, 179 N.W.2d 554, 556 (Iowa 1970) (citations omitted).
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designation was not contrary to the spirit of the comprehensive plan.11
The dissent held that on such facts, the amendment constituted illegal
spot zoning.1 " However, the dissent's view of the zoning process ignored
the fact that the city council is the designated body with expertise in
planning and zoning. Instead, it focused on the fact that the rezoning
from R-5 to C-1 created an island of land use. The creation of an island or
spot is only one indicia of spot zoning which may, in fact, be overcome.
Other indicia include land use at the time of the original zoning or-
dinance, current use, uses of surrounding area, burden imposed upon the
land, adaptability of premises for rezoned use, adaptability of surroun-
ding premises and pattern of development. These factors are relevant to
the purposes of a comprehensive plan.
C. Nonconforming Uses
A nonconforming use is a use which exists prior to the implementa-
tion of a zoning ordinance or prior to the implementation of an amend-
ment.121 It is a preexisting use which is allowed to continue under certain
prescribed conditions. The situation is created by Euclidian zoning in
that the initial establishing of districts designates areas for particular
uses. There may already exist in the area other uses not allowable in the
new district; thus results the nonconforming use. Even if an ordinance
was designed where all districts had only legitimate uses, it would be dif-
ficult to put these districts into the total plan of the city without incom-
patible districts adjacent to each other.
With increasing urbanization, the problem of noncomforming uses oc-
curs more frequently, particularly when residents from an expanding
metropolitian area have encircled business or industry that had previous-
ly been in a commercial zone. This is also true when existing residential
areas become commercialized. When cities incorporate and initially pass
zoning ordinances, invariably noncomforming uses will be created.
Nonconforming uses are inimical to the objectives of Euclidian zoning,
i.e., maintaining compatible uses within the same district and continuity
in community planning. Such uses are a financial burden because they de-
mand municipal services not necessitated by adjoining land uses. Further,
they tend to adversely affect the early development of the community as
a whole by reducing the value of surrounding property. Depending on the
use, they often result in increased traffic, unpleasant odors, polluted air
and water, increased noise and a less pleasing appearance.'2
119. Id at 559.
120. Id.
121. ANDERSON. supra note 45, at 6.01-.73; RATHKOPF. supra note 45, at 58-1.
122. See Graham, Legislative Techniques for the Amortization of the Nonconforming
Use, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 435 (1966).
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Historically, property used for a purpose which was later declared
unlawful acquired a vested right to continue as a nonconformity. This ap-
plied to structures as well as uses. This right developed because courts
were reluctant to give zoning ordinances a retroactive effect which would
substantially destroy existing property rights. However, the existence of
nonconforming uses or structures comes into conflict with the goal of
adopting an overall workable comprehensive plan; and for this reason,
the elimination of nonconforming uses, or measures to discourage their
continuation have resulted. It was not advisable to allow a nonconfor-
mity to merely live out its life by not allowing reasonable repairs to ex-
isting structures and uses because the consequent effect would be devalu-
ing property, thus affecting surrounding properties adversely.
One means of discouraging the prolongation of nonconforming uses is
to prohibit substantial structural alterations. However, in Granger v.
Board of Adjustment,"' the court allowed the manufacturer of burial
vaults to replace the frame walls of his noncomforming building with con-
crete and steel which substantially prolonged the use of this nonconformi-
ty. Courts often allow changes which allow nonconforming uses to con-
tinue without encouraging their expansion.
The premise of nonconforming uses assumed that they disappear at
the end of their own natural life. However, preexisting uses were shown
to have no tendency to disappear. Rather they became monopolies within
a given area and insofar as businesses were concerned they tended to
thrive and prosper. Thus, techniques were sought to eliminate these uses.
One available technique was that of eminent domain. However, due to
the great capital expenditure called for, it was not financially feasible to
use this to any great extent. Secondly, the uses could be terminated
under a theory of nuisance, i.e., in the context of the neighborhood in
which the use is situated it presented a nuisance. But it was thought that
the nuisance theory would be of only limited benefit and would be effec-
tive only as a supplement to some other form of termination.'24 Elimina-
tion of noncomforming uses may also come about through abandonment,
legitimization, restrictions on alterations or expansion, and amortization.
Zoning ordinances also often put certain restrictions on continuation of
nonconforming uses.'25 Finally, enabling legislation has certain restraints
on the existence of nonconforming uses.'" But due to the lack of proscrip-
123. 241 Iowa 1356, 44 N.W.2d 399 (1950).
124. Note, Nonconforming Uses in Iowa: The Amortization Answer, 55 IOwA L. REV.
998, 1004-06 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Nonconforming Uses].
125. See, e.g., CLIVE, IOWA, ZONING ORD. § 9 (March, 1972).
126. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-68 (Supp. 1977), which merely allows a noncon-
forming use to continue and repairs to be made in the event of partial destruction. But note,
the Iowa enabling legislation contains no guidelines limiting nonconforming uses.
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tions in enabling legislation, the control of noncomforming uses rests with
the judiciary."
The legitimization method of elimination is to make a nonconforming
use a conformity as was done in Keller. This type of rezoning naturally
runs the risk of resulting in spot zoning and becoming invalid for those
reasons. Moreover, to establish a rule that nonconforming uses can be
legitimized by amendment will make the ultimate goal of an efficient com-
prehensive plan more difficult to obtain and the nonconformity may be
used as the basis on which to seek an amendment to the zoning or-
dinance. 28
Amortization is attractive as it gives the nonconforming use a
reasonable period in which to recoup its investment and in fact make a
reasonable return on that investment before it is eliminated."2 Pro-
fessor Daniel Mandelker wrote in 1958:
Unfortunately, the Iowa Supreme Court has now made the elimina-
tion of the noncomforming use almost an impossibility. In a series of.re-
cent decisions it has permitted the indefinite prolongation of noncomform-
ing uses and has sanctioned the exercise of the amending power to
validate noncomformity .... [I]n Stoner McCray System v. City of Des
Moines, [247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d 843 (1956)] the court struck down an
amortization ordinance which directed the removal of nonconforming bill
boards after two years. Not only has one of the cardinal aims of zoning
now been frustrated, but the Stoner decision has limited the usefulness of
the zoning power as a technique to deal with the newer problems of land
use control.
As a consequence, the Iowa municipality is helpless under the zoning
power to do anything more than freeze the existing land use pattern.
Nonconforming uses cannot be extripated and may be entitled to be
substantially rebuilt if not validated by amendment to the zoning or-
dinance. Of even greater significance is the conceptual basis for the
Stoner opinion. While the decision is ambiguous, it can be read as holding
127. Mandelker, Prolonging the Nonconforming Use: Judicial Restriction on the Power
to Zone in Iowa, 8 DRAKE L. REV. 23 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Mandelker on Nonconform-
ing Use]; Nonconforming Uses, supra note 124.
128. See Mandelker on Nonconforming Use, supra note 127.
129. See generally Anderson, The Non-conforming Use-a Product of Euclidian Zon-
ing, 10 SYRACUSE L. REV. 214 (1959); Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses & Structures,
20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 305 (1955). The central concern of opponents to amortization or-
dinances is that such an ordinance is confiscatory. However, those jurisdictions that uphold
the validity of the ordinances do so on the basis that one who recovers a reasonable return
on investment has not been deprived of property without just compensation. See, e.g., Har-
bison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958); Town of Hemp-
stead v. Romano, 33 Misc. 2d 315, 226 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Although the theory of a
reasonable return may be upheld, application of the principle may be difficult and costly. See
Note, A Suggested Means of Determining the Proper Amortization Period for Nonconform-
ing Structures, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1975).
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that a zoning ordinance may not operate retroactively except to eliminate
a use which would constitute a nuisance under the common law."
However, the Stoner decision did not expressly terminate the
possibility that an amortization ordinance could be held valid:
We do not wish to infer herein that under certain circumstances a
municipality could not provide for the termination of noncomforming uses,
especially if the period of amortization of the investment was just and
reasonable, and the present use was a source of danger to the public
health, morals, safety or general welfare of those who have come to be oc-
cupants of the surrounding territory."'
The case of Board of Supervisors v. Miller' suggested that if a
reasonable amount of time has been given, an amortization scheme will
be constitutionally valid. The Miller court was equally divided in its opi-
nion, and thus cannot be cited as authoritative;" it does, however, show a
substantial diminution of the restrictiveness of Stoner. Given the assump-
tion that noncomforming uses are contra to good zoning, it would seem
desirable for the legislature to pass a statute establishing mandatory
standards for their elimination.
The MLDC presents an alternative method of discontinuing land uses
incompatible with a comprehensive plan."u Existing uses cannot be
eliminated in the absence of a state or local plan which has established a
policy of maintaining a neighborhood and unless the use is found to be in-
consistent with the character of that neighborhood. 35 The affected area is
130. Mandelker on Nonconforming Use, supra note 127, at 23, 31-32.
It must be noted that the Stoner court invalidated the ordinance because there was no
authority for it in the enabling legislation. Stoner McCray System v. City of Des Moines, 247
Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d 843 (1956). While the statute has not changed, it is arguable that in
light of the current trend of the law and the favorable treatment of amortization ordinances
throughout other parts of the country this result may not be obtained today. A less
pessimistic view of nonconforming uses and amortization in Iowa does exist, however. See
Nonconforming Uses, supra note 124.
131. Stoner McCray System v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 1320, 78 N.W.2d 843,
848 (1956).
132. 170 N.W.2d 358 (Iowa 1969), noted in 19 DRAKE L. REV. 508 (1970).
133. Because the court in Miller was equally divided, the opinion below stands but the
decision is of no further force or authority. See IOWA CODE § 684.10 (1977).
134. MLDC art. 4 (Prop. Off. Draft 1975). The drafters of the Code reject the existing
law of nonconforming uses as being too rigid. Basically, the existing law seeks to have non-
conforming uses eliminated merely because they do not conform to those uses found in a
specific rigid district. The MLDC art. 4, at 177 (Prop. Off. Draft 1975) starts from a new
premise: "ITihat existing use of land should be encouraged to conform to new land develop-
ment regulations only if those regulations embody a policy that a specifically defined
neighborhood character should be maintained over a substantial period of time." Id. There-
fore, the Code suggests that there must be a policy other than thoughtless conformity before
existing uses are eliminated.
135. Id. § 4-102(1)(a). This is the basic premise for reducing nonconforming uses; other
methods are enunciated in §§ 4-102(b) to (e).
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given a definite time period (one month is suggested) to comply with an
order to discontinue."' The enforcement agency, however, is empowered
to grant exemptions"7 or extensions of time to allow the landowner a
reasonable period of amortization" based on economic usefulness, urgen-
cy of public purpose and cost of discontinuance. The proposal has at least
two immediately recognizable advantages. First, assuming Iowa does not
authorize amortization, this proposal will rectify that. Secondly, it forces
the municipality to plan for the elimination and have a purpose other
than blind conformity to the law of nonconforming uses.
There has not been unanimity in the Iowa courts for allowing the ex-
pansion of noncomforming uses. Indeed, they have been somewhat
restrictive about the expansion of nonconforming uses. In Zimmerman v.
O'Meara,'" landowners were denied a variance to convert a nonconform-
ing single-family residence to a duplex because of area requirements. The
court overturned the previously granted variance because of insufficient
evidence to allow the change. However, in Granger v. Board of Adjust-
ment, substantial structural alteration was permitted." '
In Stan Moore Motors, Inc. v. Polk County Board of Adjustment,""
the landowner sought to erect a canopy on a nonconforming building.
The building permit was denied, the district court upheld the denial, and
the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The nonconformity was that the
building was too close to adjoining streets and the construction of the
canopy involved the extension of the rafters. The court upheld the denial
of the permit on the ground that it was an enlargement or extension of a
noncomforming use which was expressly prohibited by the zoning or-
dinance of Polk County. This case seems to be in accord with McJimsey
v. City of Des Moines"" and insofar as it cites Granger, it shows a will-
ingness of the Iowa courts to restrict the extension of nonconforming
uses.
The court was again faced with the issue of a noncomforming use in
Trailer City, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment."' This case represents a
curious addition to the law of nonconforming uses in Iowa. Since 1948, the
plaintiff operated a trailer park in Pottawattamie County. The park was
outside the city limits until June 4, 1969, on which date all property in-
volved was annexed to the City of Council Bluffs. Beginning July 1, 1961,
136. Id § 4-202(1).
137. Id § 4-202(2).
138. Id § 4-202(3.
139. 215 Iowa 1140, 245 N.W. 715 (1932). See Weldon v. Zoning Bd., 250 N.W.2d 396
(Iowa 1977); McJimsey v. City of Des Moines, 231 Iowa 693, 2 N.W.2d 65 (1942).
140. 241 Iowa 1356, 44 N.W.2d 399 (1950).
141. 209 N.W.2d 50 (Iowa 1973).
142. 231 Iowa 693, 2 N.W.2d 65 (1942). See Weldon v. Zoning Bd., 250 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa
1977).
143. 218 N.W.2d 645 (Iowa 1974).
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the property was governed by the county zoning ordinance, and under
both the county and city ordinances, the area was zoned for residential
purposes with the trailer park continuing as a nonconforming use. In
1961, the plaintiff developed a comprehensive plan of development for the
park and its future expansion. The development of the park from 1961
had been continuous. In 1961, the plaintiff, with permission from the pro-
per state authorities, undertook development of his land and invested ap-
proximately $75,000 to convert a swamp into a lagoon adjacent to the
park. Additional work was done on a sewer plant at the cost of between
$45-47,000.
On March 23, 1971, plaintiff applied to the Board of Adjustment for
modification of its nonconforming use and advised the Board of its inten-
tion to develop various additional lots as sites for mobile homes. The
Board denied approval and the district court overturned the Board on the
grounds that the Board acted-in excess of its jurisdiction in denying the
application.
The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding of illegality
and its finding that the application was "not an enlargement or extension
of a nonconforming use.""' The court noted that "substantial construction
on the entire tract had been commenced and substantial liability incurred
and that the entire tract owned by (Trailer City was] a nonconforming
use as a mobile home park at that time the tract become subject to city
zoning regulations." ' 5 The court based its decision on the equities of the
case rather than on any existing law.
It seems clear that in Trailer City the court abdicated its role of
reviewing and applying the law of nonconforming uses in that this was
clearly an expansion of the existing use in face of the fact that various
additional lots were to be developed. This case may be an anomaly
and hopefully it will be one which may have limited application due to its
procedural nature.
In Conley v. Warne,' an adjoining landowner brought an equity ac-
tion against his neighbor and a building contractor to enjoin the
reconstruction of a dwelling, claiming it was a zoning violation. The trial
court held that the plaintiff was estopped from complaining and denied
injunctive relief. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed on estoppel grounds
but reversed insofar as the structure constituted a nonconforming use.
The side yard requirments were not met and the length of the sundeck
exceeded area requirements. The court held that such a nonconforming
structure could not be expanded or enlarged.
Thus, it seems that the law of noncomforming uses in Iowa is in
somewhat of a state of flux. On one hand it gives vent to the traditional
144. Trailer City, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 218 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Iowa 1974).
145. Id.
146. 236 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976).
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view that such uses shall not be expanded, but in the case law various
devices do allow for such expansion. Furthermore, there exists in-
conclusive but persuasive authority for the elimination of nonconforming
uses through the amortization scheme.
D. Rezoning and Zoning Amendments
Zoning ordinances began in 1916 and became increasingly popular
with the passage of the revised SZEA in 1926. Changing trends in urbaniza-
tion and suburban development as well as towards large scale land develop-
ment have necessitated numerous amendments to existing zoning or-
dinances. The issue of rezoning or amendments to ordinances has two
perspectives--the municipality may rezone or the landowner may seek to
have his land rezoned.
Amendments and rezonings initiated by a municipality fall principally
into the following categories:
(a) The previously existing ordinance having been found inadequate in the
face of conditions which have developed since its enactment and it is
replaced in its entirety;
(b) Where changing conditions affecting or with a tendency to affect a
previously undeveloped area of the community but having little or no im-
pact upon the settled portion thereof, it is necessary to amend the or-
dinance with respect to the previously undeveloped area;
(c) Where a previously existing ordinance is amended only with respect to
the uses of a particular area, comparatively small in size, or with respect
to a particular piece of property-and an amendment of this type usually
involving a claim of spot zoning."7
To these might also be added the situation where a developer has
amassed an area of land (e.g., for use as a shopping center or industrial
park) that may be too large for a variance, but where the city finds a zon-
ing amendment or rezoning would be advantageous.
The second perspective of rezoning or amendment is where a par-
ticular landowner may, instead of seeking a variance, choose to seek
rezoning of his land. In light of the developing trend towards large scale
development, this presents a viable alternative for a landowner with a
large tract of land.
In addition to this dual nature of the rezoning issue there are pro-
cedural and substantive aspects. Procedurally, an amendment or a rezon-
ing is promulgated by the city council and must proceed as if the original
zoning ordinance was being implemented, i.e., after notice and a public
hearing."' Furthermore, after the adoption of a new zoning ordinance, the
zoning commission may, from time to time, recommend zone changes to
147. RATHKOPF, supra note 45, at 27-1 to 27-2.
148. IOWA CODE §§ 358A.6-7, 414.4-.5 (1977).
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the council.149 Changes to a zoning ordinance can be thwarted by a protest
of twenty per cent of the owners of the area, in which case the change is
not effective except by the favorable vote of at least three-fourths of the
council members.1 50
The amendment to an ordinance must naturally be drawn within the
limits of the zoning power delegated by the enabling legislation and must
conform to a comprehensive plan already in existence or it must con-
stitute a new plan. It must also be reasonable and avoid the danger of
being classified as spot or piecemeal zoning. 5' However, the Iowa courts
have set up a distinction between the original ordinance and a substantial
amendment as opposed to minor rezoning or minor amendments. 1 5 It
should be noted that the board of adjustment is not the appellate body
for challenging rezoning classifications but rather the district court is the
149. Id. §§ 358A.8, 414.6. See C.C. Bowen v. Story County Bd. of Supervisors, 209
N.W.2d 569, 571 (Iowa 1973).
150. IOWA CODE §§ 358A.7, 414.5 (1977). The protest mechanism may serve to quell
dissident landowners but it does not necessarily promote the most efficient and equitable
utilization of land when popular sentiment can garner enough votes to disregard good plan-
ning. Naturally, this is stating the obvious to anyone who has appeared before a municipal
body with an unpopular cause. E.g., neighborhood reaction against low-income housing or a
fast-food restaurant in a single family detached dwelling district will often defeat a rezoning
proposal regardless of planning ramifications. The primary inquiry here is with whom does
zoning and planning expertise allegedly reside? To carry this one step further-is zoning by
referendum (popular opinion if you will) desirable from a planning standpoint? See City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Freilich, Editor's Comment.
The Diminishing Role of the Federal Judiciary in Metropolitan Land Use Disputes, 8 URBAN
LAW. vii (1976); Comment, Referendum Zoning: The State and Federal Issues and a Sug-
gested Approach, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 907 (1977). See also RATHKOPF supra note 45, at 28-1 to
28-16 (chapter on neighborhood protests).
151. See, e.g., Comment, 30 IOWA L. REV. 135 (1944).
152. Smith v. City of Fort Dodge, 160 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1968). Landowners challenged
the city's rezoning of a property from single family to multifamily for the purpose of erecting
a nursing home. The challengers contended that the city did not comply with the notice and
hearing requirement of Iowa Code §§ 373.16 (repealed 1975), 414.16 (1977). The supreme court
rejected this challenge on the basis that Iowa Code §§ 373.19 (repealed 1975), 414.6 (1977),
was restricted to the original comprehensive zoning ordinance and to "substantial" amend-
ments. The latter were defined as a "general modification of the zoning districts or regula-
tions in that law, not isolated, minor, or individual changes such as appear herein." Smith v.
City of Fort Dodge, 160 N.W.2d 492, 497 (Iowa 1968).
Even accepting the court's dichotomy, for which there is no expressed support in Iowa
Code §§ 414.4, 414.5, 414.6 (1977), which when read together require a notice and hearing
prior to a zone change, the relief granted in Smith is arguably a variance for which a public
hearing before the board of adjustment is required in Iowa Code § 414.9 (1977).
The seemingly erroneous belief espoused in Smith is supported in dictum in Velie Out-
door Advertising of Sioux City, Inc. v. City of Sioux City, 252 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Iowa 1977)
(the ultimate decision was that a sign ordinance was not subject to comprehensive plan
amendment requirements).
In fact, the failure of a city to provide notice or hold hearings prior to the adoption of a
zoning ordinance amendment makes the amendment void. B & H Investments, Inc. v. City of
Coralville, 209 N.W.2d 115 (Iowa 1973).
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proper body."M These procedural requirements are mandatory and
jurisdictional without which the rezoning is invalid.
Substantively, courts will examine surrounding circumstances in
ascertaining the reasonableness of any ordinance. Case law provides the
criteria which influence court decisions in this area. An Illinois case is in-
structive in this regard."M In LaSalle, the courts succinctly set forth the
factors to be considered in reviewing the reasonableness of an ordinance.
These apply to the validity of a ordinance when initially enacted as well
as to the validity of a rezoning or an amendment to an ordinance:
(1) The existing uses and zoning of nearby property;
(2) The reduction in property value resulting from the particular zoning
restriction;
(3) The extent to which the destruction of property values of the site
promotes the general health, safety and welfare of the public;
(4) The relative gain to the public as compared to the hardship imposed
upon the individual property owner;
(5) The suitability of the particular property for the zone purposes;
(6) The length of time the property has been vacant, as zoned, con-
sidered in the context of land development in the area where the property is
located."'5
This type of showing is necessary before a landowner can attempt to
rezone his land successfully. Naturally, the procedural requirements must
be followed and the landowner must appear before the council and ask
the council to initiate the procedure or to have the zoning commission or
planning authority study and recommend that the area be rezoned.
In F. H. Uelner Precision T. & D., Inc. v. City of Dubuque,5 " the
plaintiff sought to have the rezoning of its land from business or light in-
dustry to multi-family declared invalid. Previously the premises had been
zoned for business or light industrial use, but the city in 1965 decided to
formulate a general development plan and pursuant to that plan the area
153. The court in Boomhower v. Cerro Gordo Co. Bd. of Adjustment, 163 N.W.2d 75, 77
(Iowa 1968), a case which dealt with the county ordinance, stated:
Amendment of a zoning ordinance is a legislative function placed in the board
of supervisors. The board of adjustment which is granted quasi-judicial and ad-
ministrative functions was not given and should not have veto power over the
legislative body. The board of adjustment is established to prevent injustice being
done to those persons not fitting within the zoning ordinances as adopted by the
board of supervisors. It is to help make workable the ordinances and not to sit as a
judicial body to determine the propriety of their adoption. Parties who claim such
ordinance or amendment thereto is arbitrary or capricious should seek relief in the
courts by petition for a writ of certiorari.
Id See also Anderson v. Jester, 206 Iowa 452, 221 N.W. 354 (1928).
154. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Village of Harwood Heights, 2 11. App. 3d 1040, 278 N.E.2d
114 (1971).
155. Id. at 1045-46, 278 N.E.2d at 117-18.
156. 190-N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1971).
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was designated as multi-family. The residents in that area then petitioned
for a rezoning to multi-family which was passed by the city council. The
plaintiff alleged that property values decreased and that noncomforming
uses were created which prevented any substantial repairs or expansions.
The district court held the ordinance invalid.
The case involves the role of zoning and the fulfillment of long-range
city planning. Traditionally, zoning has been employed as a holding action
to prevent deterioration of districts, and amendments have usually rezon-
ed districts "down" rather than "up". In the present instance the rezoning
was up, not down. It was a holding action as to the largely residential 12
blocks, recommended for inclusion by the Commission to prevent further
incursion of commerce and industry. But the rezoning cannot be expected
to stabilize six and one-half blocks already having businesses and in-
dustries. More likely those structures will decline. Unquestionably the
rezoning was a proper use of zoning power to stabilize portions largely
residential. That portion did not develop industrially because of changes
and transportation methods.... Our problem relates to the portion which
did in fact develop commercially and industrially as originally hoped.'
The court went on to note that while residential zoning may have a
beneficial effect for a portion of the tract, it did not facilitate good plan-
ning in terms of the commercial tract.
But the northern portion of the area involving several businesses and
light industries in proximity to each other presents a different case. Some
of these firms have been there many years. A number of the properties
represent very substantial investments. None of the activities of the firms
is shown to be offensive -other than the fact itself of being commercial or
industrial. The founders established those firms when the area was unzon-
ed or in reliance on then existing zoning. Rezoning will work hardship.
Moreover, rezoning will not likely stabilize that portion of the area but, if
anything, will have a deteriorating influence. We do not have here a
relatively few or isolated nonconforming uses compared to the area as a
whole. . . . Rather, the north part of this area is quite substantially com-
mercial and industrial. On the balancing the possible public good against
the harm to plaintiffs, we arrive at the conclusion reached by the commis-
sion and the trial court. We hold the rezoning unreasonable as applied to
plaintiffs property."
Relative to the implementation of the master plan the court said that
zoning may not be used to achieve this end. A technique suggested was
condemnation.
This case presents a classic example of the interrelatedness of zoning
and planning and is an example of the limited use of certain zoning tools,
particularly rezoning. The city's desire to see this tract changed from
business or light industry to multi-family could not be accomplished if the
157. F.H. Uelner Precision T. & D., Inc. v. City of Dubuque, 190 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Iowa
1971) (citations omitted).
158. Id. at 469.
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surrounding circumstances did not warrant it, especially if the landowner
is adversely affected economically.
One substantive argument often used to invalidate a zoning amend-
ment is that the ordinance constitutes piecemeal or spot zoning and
therefore, is not in accordance with a comprehensive plan. For example,
in Keller v. City of Council Bluffs,'59 the property was rezoned to permit
a nursing home in an island of single-family residences. The contention
was that this was spot zoning and illegal insofar as a small tract of land
was involved.' s
The Keller court concluded that because of changed circumstances
the amendment was necessary.
So if the only reasonable use of the property is seriously affected by
the zoning ordinance, the owner should be entitled to relief, and, in addi-
tion, if the legislative body under any reasonable interpretation of the
facts could say there was such an interference with that use, its action
could not be held arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory."'
However, this reading of the Keller case seems to mistake the true
purpose of having a comprehensive and workable plan. Here the
municipality took a small tract of land and rezoned it so as to validate
what was an inconsistent use of property. If in fact this is a nonconform-
ing use, then so be it. But to legitimize it presents a possible inconsisten-
cy in that neighborhood.
The court can be criticized for allowing the owner of the property to
make the argument that since the land was an inconsistent use that it
should be given relief. The only relief which the landowner is entitled to
under good zoning and planning theory is to be able to continue the non-
comformity at least long enough to recoup or make an adequate return on
his investment before property is further restricted. Rezoning should not
be used to legitimize an incompatible use. Rather, rezoning should be
utilized to foster good planning in a developing community.
The types of conditions that will almost assuredly sustain a rezoning
were exemplified in Jaffe v. City of Davenport"2 where the property was
rezoned from residential to commercial in light of: rapid and intense
development along heavily traveled thoroughfares; an inability to sell the
properties as residential; the need for commercial users in that area;
159. 246 Iowa 202, 66 N.W.2d 113 (1954).
160. See notes 108 to 111 and accompanying text supra where the case is more fully
described relative to spot zoning.
161. Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 210, 66 N.W.2d 113, 118 (1954); see
Hermann v. City of Des Moines, 250 Iowa 1281, 1284-85, 97 N.W.2d 893, 895 (1959) wherein
the court discussed one criteria to be utilized to validate a zone change: "Zoning ordinances
may be amended at any time conditions warrant, and the action of the zoning authorities w'ill
not be interfered with if the question is fairly debatable." Id. See Hanna v. Rathje, 171
N.W.2d 876 (Iowa 1969) (conditions warranted rezoning to permit mobile home park).
162. 179 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa 1970).
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declining opposition to the zoning change; the development of the rest of
the area to commercial; and testimony that this was the highest and best
use of the property.163
Land use litigation, like any trial determination, depends upon an ef-
fective marshalling of facts. However, the case law is often devoid of a
delineation of those factors that a court will examine in granting or deny-
ing requested relief. In the area of rezoning as well as other land use
areas, it is necessary to examine the case law to determine what was per-
suasive to a particular court. Rezoning and amendments to the ordinance
are useful tools but it is imperative that they are utilized with proper
forethought and a formulated plan.
E. Special Exceptions
Another power given to the board of adjustment by both the SZEA
and the enabling legislation is the power to hear and decide special ex-
ceptions to the terms of the ordinance upon which the board is required
to pass.16' Under this authority, the board may issue a special exception
or special use permit for those uses specified in the ordinance as special
or conditional if the conditions are satisfied. Thus, a special exception is
in fact a permitted use with certain additional conditions attached."'5 The
special exception is a device designed to facilitate the creation of par-
ticular uses which have characteristics making it necessary to set par-
ticular conditions. For example, churches, schools and hospitals may have
special needs that must be satisfied before they can comfortably fit into
another district. These are distinct from variances in that once you can
show that the conditions have been satisfied, you are entitled as a matter
of right to the special exception and there is no required showing of un-
necessary hardship. This likewise differs from a rezoning in that the
163. Jaffe v. City of Davenport, 179 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Iowa 1970). See Anderson v. City
of Cedar Rapids, 168 N.W.2d 739 (Iowa 1969) (rezoning from residential to neighborhood shop-
ping district valid). But see Keppy v. Ehlers, 253 Iowa 1021, 115 N.W.2d 198 (1962) (rezoning
from rural to light industry invalid).
164. SZEA, supra note 44, at § 7; IOWA CODE §§ 414.12(2) and 358A.15(2) (1977).
165. 3 ANDERSON, supra note 45, §§ 15.01-.32. Professor Anderson distinguishes special
exceptions from special permits. Basically, he characterizes the special exception as a permit
that the board of adjustment must grant as a matter of right if it finds the facts to so war-
rant. The board in the special exception category utilizes no discretion. The special permit,
however, requires the board of adjustment to exercise administrative judgment guided by
rather broad standards. Id at § 15.03. Neither Professor Rathkopf nor Professor Hagman
make this distinction. 2 RATHKOPF, supra note 45, at §§ 54.1-.52; HAGMAN, supra note 19, at
§§ 113-15.
For the most part special exeptions, special use permits and conditional use permits
have a similar function: they each allow a landowner to make a use of his property as a mat-
ter of right without the need for showing unnecessary hardship as is required in the variance
situation. These terms will be used interchangeably here.
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underlying zoning is established and there is no need for a zone change.
Flexibility is one of the attractive aspects of special use permits.'"
Procedurally, it is the board of adjustment who must hear and decide
the special use permit case. In Depue v. City of Clinton,"7 the Iowa
Supreme Court held invalid the city council's grant of a special use per-
mit, finding this act to be in derrogation of the statute granting this
authority to the board of adjustment. For relief, the appropriate action
from the city council is a rezoning which in fact had been attempted in
the Depue case and was denied. The city, however, allocated jurisdiction
over special use permits to the council and special exceptions to the
board. The court'disregarded this distinction and held that it is the board
of adjustment who has original jurisdiction:
The foregoing cases all indicate an interpretive history for Chapter
414 which would require the city to place what we have called the quasi
judicial function of granting special exceptions in the board of ad-
justments. This interpretaton is buttressed by legislative provisions for
review of the board's action by the courts not by the council." '
Additionally, in City of Des Moines v. Lohner,' the city, through its
ordinance, gave the city council the authority to make determinations on
special uses. The court again held that such was impermissible. Nor can
the power to grant a special use permit be delegated to the zoning com-
mission.11
In order to have a valid special use ordinance, it is necessary that cer-
tain standards are set to guide administrative actions, although the stan-
dards need not be so specific as to preclude all discretion.' In Iowa, the
courts have generally permitted the board of adjustment to exercise
broad discretion in making those decisions."2 However, in Chicago, R.I. &
166. HAGMAN, supra note 19, at § 113. This type of zoning is successfully used in con-
nection with planned unit developments and cluster developments.
167. 160 N.W.2d 860 (Iowa 1968).
168. Depue v. City of Clinton, 160 N.W.2d 860, 863 (Iowa 1968).
169. 168 N.W.2d 779 (Iowa 1969).
170. See Buchholz v. Board of Adjustment, 199 N.W.2d 73 (Iowa 1972).
171. See, e.g., Kotrich v. County of Du Page, 19 II. 2d 181, 166 N.E.2d 601, appeal
dismissed, 364 U.S. 475 (1960); Comment, Zoning-Changes in Zoning Restrictions- Validity
of the "Special Use" Technique, 46 IOWA L. REV. 479 (1960). See also Mandelker, Delegation
of Power and Function in Zoning Administration, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 60.
172. In Scott v. City of Waterloo, 223 Iowa 1169, 274 N.W. 897 (1937), plaintiffs
challenged the issuance of a building permit for a filling station in a restricted residential
zone. The ordinance establishing the zone simply provided that "no buildings . . . except
residences, schoolhouses, churches and other similar structures" could be erected in that area
"without first procuring from the city council a permit." This is a prototype special exception
case, but for granting unfettered authority to the city council rather than the board of ad-
justment.
Although there were no standards to guide the council, the court held the issuance of
the permit to be valid. "The statute and ordinance expressly authorized the granting of such
permits upon such reasonable rules and regulations as may be provided. The fact that no
[Vol. 27
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P. R. Co. v. Liddle,73 the Iowa Supreme Court invalidated an unlimited
grant of power to the Board of Adjustment pursuant to the zoning
statute.
The plaintiff in the Liddle case owned property classified as M-2,
heavy industrial, on which it sought to erect stockyards with twenty pens
for the care and feeding of livestock which was to be loaded and trans-
ported on its trains. The ordinance specifically stated that the premises
within that district could be used for any purposes including stockyards
but that no permit should be issued for stockyards "until and unless the
location of such use shall have been authorized by the Board after report
by the Fire Prevention Bureau of the fire department and the health
department." '74 The plaintiffs alleged that the denial of the permit for the
stockyard was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable insofar as the or-
dinance delegated to the board the power to determine whether a
stockyard permit should issue without fixing any standards to guide or
limit the board in making that determination. The court agreed with the
plaintiff's contentions and in interpreting Chapter 414, noted that the
board of adjustment may very well be delegated power to issue these ex-
ceptions, however:
We can find in the state statute no guides or standards by which the
board is to act in exercising such power as is delegated to it by Part XIV
of the zoning ordinance. The ordinance itself, insofar as it is contained in
the record (presumably all that is here pertinent), provides that authoriza-
tion by the board of a permit to occupy stockyards shall come after report
by the Fire Prevention Bureau of the fire department and the health
department. No duty is placed on the board to abide by any recommenda-
tions contained in these reports. This provision can hardly be said to pro-
vide adequate standards to the board's exercise of power under Part XIV.
And we find in the ordinance no other guides or standards for the board's
exercise of this particular power.
We must conclude the ordinance confers upon the board virtually
unlimited power, conditioned only upon receiving a report from the Fire
Prevention Bureau and the health department unaccompanied by ade-
quate guides or standards, to authorize or not authorize a permit for
stockyards in an M-2 district. So far as the statutes or the ordinance pro-
vides, the board may arbitrarily deny such a permit for a good reason, a
bad reason, or no reason at all. Such a grant of virtually unlimited power
is invalid and offends against the Constitutional provisions plaintiff has in-
voked relating to due process and equal protection of the law.'
rules and regulations are contained in this particular ordinance does not invalidate it." Scott
v. City of Waterloo, 223 Iowa 1169, 1173, 274 N.W. 897, 900 (1937).
Accord, Marquis v. City of Waterloo, 210 Iowa 439, 228 N.W. 870 (1930). Note that the
Scott and Marquis cases deal with the restricted residential district law, formerly Iowa Code
ch. 415 (repealed 1972), rather than the zoning law, IOWA CODE ch. 414 (1977).
173. 253 Iowa 402, 112 N.W.2d 852 (1962).
174. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Liddle, 253 Iowa 402, 404 and 405; 112 N.W.2d 852, 853
(1962).
175. Id. at 407-08, 112 N.W.2d at 855.
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Thus, the lack of standards or guidelines resulted in a finding of an
unconstitutional delegation to the board of adjustment of a legislative
function.
It seems clear that the objective of a special use permit is to
specifically delineate those situations in which particular uses can be placed
within a given district so that they will not be incompatible with sur-
rounding uses and will fit into the overall plan. However, when standards
grant a great amount of discretion to the board, the special use permit
can be easily abused as illustrated by Liddle. This device can also be us-
ed as an exclusionary weapon; e.g., no apartment buildings unless the
board of adjustment finds the granting of a special permit for such will
promote the general welfare. The question is fairly raised-what then
constitutes adequate standards.
In Schultz v. Board of Adjustment," ' these standards were held to be
sufficient and the conditions were held to be permissible:
The Board of Adjustment in reviewing an application for a conditional
use may consider the most appropriate use of the land; the conservation
and stabilization of the value of property; adequate open space for light
and air; concentration of population; congestion of public streets; the pro-
motion of the public safety, morale, health, convenience, and comfort; and
the general welfare of the persons residing or working in the
neighborhood of such use. In addition to the general requirements of this
ordinance, in granting a conditional use, the Board of Adjustment may
recommend conditions be attached which it finds are necessary to carry
out the purpose of this ordinance. These conditions may increase the re-
quired lot or yard, control the location and number of vehicular access
points to the property, limit the number of signs, limit coverage or height
of buildings because of obstruction to view and reduction of light and air
to adjacent property, and require screening and landscaping where
necessary to reduce noise and glare and maintain the property in a
character in keeping with the surrounding area. "7
This merely reinterates the general objectives of zoning. If these re-
quirements were imposed on the apartment example, a municipality could
easily exclude such use altogether either because the proposal does not
satisfy the standards or by setting conditions that are financially imprac-
tical to meet. Herein lies the danger of inadequate standards. Thus, the
grant of discretion argument cuts two ways. On the one hand, the stan-
176. 258 Iowa 804, 139 N.W.2d 448 (1966). In Schultz the plaintiff attacked the county
board's grant of a condi tional use permit for a sanitary land fill in a general manufacturing
district on the ground that it was an unconstitutional delegation of authority. The court
nevertheless upheld the standards.
177. Schultz v. Board of Adjustment, 258 Iowa 804, 809, 139 N.W.2d 448, 451 (1966)
(note the similarities between this standard and Iowa Code § 358A.5 (1977)). See Town of
Grimes v. Board of Adjustment, 243 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 1976) (grant of special use permit for
sanitary landfill valid); Vogelaar v. Polk Co. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 188 N.W.2d 860 (Iowa
1971) (landfill satisfied special use requirements).
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dards must be sufficient enough that the developer can meet them; on
the other, they must be flexible enough to give to the municipality some
leeway in prescribing uses and conditions before the grant of a special
permit. However, the grant of authority must not be so open-ended as to
give the Board the power to completely exclude. Another example of the
exclusionary ramifications of the conditional use or special exception is
the setting of conditions that are impossible to met, e.g., no adult
bookstore within 1000 yards of any school-in a town with no such dimen-
sion.
Johnson v. Board of Adjustment'78 is a novel case in that it attacks
the device of the special exception permit as constituting spot zoning. In
Johnson, owners of property near a proposed mortuary sought to in-
validate the board of adjustment's issuance of a special use permit for the
mortuary's construction. The plaintiffs argued, inter alia, inadequacy of
the record below; inadequacy of trial judge's finding; that the zoning map
and the zoning ordinance were inconsistant; that the landowner failed to
satisfy the conditions of the ordinance; that the mortuary was a nuisance;
and that the special exception constituted spot zoning. The court, in re-
jecting the spot zoning argument, noted that the classification of a use as
a special exception is a legislative determination that it is a part of the
comprehensive plan179 and thus a permitted use.
In discussing special exceptions, it must again be emphasized that
they are permitted uses (presumably in accordance with a comprehensive
plan) and that they must be administered by reasonable standards. That
special exceptions are permitted uses is a conclusion that is reached in
the Johnson case. However, these exceptions could be invalidated by suc-
cessfully challenging the ordinance as a whole.
F. Variances
It can be safely said that the heart of the local land use control
system is the variance mechanism. Basically, variances are granted for
relief from use restrictions and relief from bulk or structural restric-
tions. '8 The enabling legislation sets out the standard to be applied: that
property owners should not be restricted to the point that an undue
hardship is created by making it difficult or impossible to utilize their prop-
erty."' A variance is granted in those cases where the results are not con-
trary to the public interest, or where literal enforcement of zoning provi-
sions would result in an unnecessary hardship. A variance should be
178. 239 N.W.2d 873 (Iowa 1976).
179. Johnson v. Board of Adjustment, 239 N.W.2d 873, 891 (Iowa 1976).
180. See ANDERSON, sup'ra note 45, at §§ 18.01-.84; HAGMAN, supra note 19, at § 106; 2
RATHKOPF, supra note 45, at 45-1 to 45-29.
181. IOWA CODE §§ 414.12(3), 358A.15(3) (1977).
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granted in the spirit of the ordinance and should result in substantial justice
being done.
From a planning perspective, the variance procedure is designed to
promote equity. It should be employed sparingly since once the plan is
set, no matter how flexible, alterations of that plan are inimical to it.
However desirable it is to minimize the number of variances granted, it
is apparent from board of adjustment meetings how loosely the board
adheres to provisions for the grant or denial of such.
The board of adjustment for various reasons (e.g., the nature of the
board, the nature of the proceedings, lack of expertise, a lack of planning
input) has not been judged to be a useful mechanism.8 ' These boards,
either due to their lack of expertise, pressure of the case load or political
pressure, tend to ignore universal standards. Consequently, the pro-
cedure is misused and abused at the local level.
However, once a board determination on a variance request is chal-
lenged in a trial court, the board's action is usually sustained due to its
wide discretion. This illustrates even more of a reason for re-evaluating
board procedures in order to further land use objectives. Arguably, the
standard of judicial review could be expanded, having the court closely
scrutinize the board's findings, in order to achieve these objectives.
Alternatively, criteria to guide the board could be defined by legislation.
In Iowa, the constitutionality of municipal zoning was upheld in
Anderson v. Jester.8 ' This issue arose in the context of a variance ap-
plication. In Deardorf v. Board of Adjustment,'85 the board of adjustment
granted a variance to the landowner for the construction of an apartment
building in an R-3 multi-family district in violation of certain bulk re-
quirements. The neighboring landowners challenged the board's action as
illegal.
The court noted that the burden was on the applicant to show that
the enforcement of the zoning ordinance would result in an unnecessary
hardship and that a variance should be granted. The plaintiff in the court
action, however, must show the board's granting of the variance to be il-
legal. The court on de novo review found no evidence to support the
showing of unnecessary hardship by the applicant and took occasion to
define this requirement:
[Blefore a variance may be granted on the ground of unnecessary hardship
it must be shown: (1) the land in question cannot yield a reasonable return
182. A popular book on zoning declares that this is really a game. BABCOCK, supra note
64.
183. Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study in
Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273 (1962); Comment, Zoning: Variance Administration in Alameda Coun-
ty, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 101 (1962).
184. 206 Iowa 452, 221 N.W. 354 (1928).
185. 254 Iowa 380, 118 N.W.2d 78 (1962).
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if used only for a purpose allowed in that zone; (2) the plight of the owner
is due to unique circumstances and not to the general conditions in the
neighborhood which may reflect the unreasonableness of the zoning or-
dinance itself; and (3) the use to be authorized by the variance will not
alter the essential character of the locality.'"
The court emphasized that power to grant a variance should be exercised
sparingly, with great caution and only in exceptional circumstances.
Other cases in Iowa do not further develop the law of granting or de-
nying variances. While Deardorf sets out three standards to be met,
there is no indication of the actual showings that must be made to obtain
a variance. In fact, all the cases deal with an inability to make a showing
of unnecessary hardship; thus, the case law is lacking in delineating those
factors which will satisfy the unnecessary hardship requirement.
An extreme and rigorous test for undue hardship applied by the
courts.would facilitate the function of variances, i.e., to provide relief on-
ly in the most exceptional circumstances. Courts generally have rigorous-
ly enforced statutory criterions of hardship. However, empirical work in
this field indicates that only a small percentage of cases where variances
are granted come before courts. Additionally, many boards of adjustment
ignore the statutory criterion of hardship because its members do not
find it to be wise or justifiable.'87
The Model Land Development Code (MLDC) proposes different stan-
dards for bulk variances and use variances. For bulk variances, relief will
be granted if compliance with the ordinance would cause practical dif-
ficulties due to the physical characteristics or if it would significantly
186. Deardorf v. Board of Adjustment, 254 Iowa 380, 386, 118 N.W.2d 78, 81 (1962). The
court rejected the argument that the land with the variance would be more profitable. Id. at
389, 118 N.W.2d at 83. See Board of Adjustment v. Ruble, 193 N.W.2d 497 (Iowa 1972); Zim-
merman v. O'Meara, 215 Iowa 1140, 245 N.W. 715 (1932).
187. See, D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 106
(1971); Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power-Constructive in Theory, Destructive in Prac-
tice, 29 MD. L. REV. 3 (1969); Comment, The General Welfare, Welfare Economies, and Zon-
ing Variance, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 548 (1965). One author suggests a rationale for the misuse of
variances.
The very fact that boards grant variances so liberally notwithstanding thirty
years of scholarly handwriting about it may suggest that there is a felt need in the
practical world for parcel land-use decision making. See, e.g., Sussna, "Zoning
Boards in Theory and Practice," 37 Land Econ. 82 (1961). The fault may lie in the
notion that land-use decisions can be made in sweeping terms on a map with the
conventional district lines and categories. The need may be for an agency capable
of making individual decisions when the owner of a parcel of land proposes to
develop it, either from scratch or by way of converting an existent use to a new
one. In a crude way, therefore, the boards may be injecting a necessary increment
of contemporariness and flexibility into an other wise static system. The real ques-
tion is how to preserve this parcel by parcel flexible approach but channel its
potential arbitrariness into a matrix of norms by which the individual decisions can
be measured in a rational and constructive way.
E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING 3-116 (2d ed. 1975).
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lessen the profit available to the landowner without causing substantial
harm to neighbors.188 The MLDC, however, treats use variances more strin-
gently. Use variances will only be granted for land which is not
reasonably capable of economic use. Further, the variance must not in-
terfere with the enjoyment of other land and not differ from the general
development more than is reasonably necessary to permit some economic
use of the land. A use variance will not be granted if it is found that the
hardship was created by the owner. The intended effect is to have the ap-
propriate agency apply a general standard of what is reasonably capable
of economic use in light of all circumstances-including the value at
which the seller acquired the land and at which he sold it to the appli-
cant. The intended result is to avoid situations where imposition of
regulations would be confiscatory or arbitrary.189
The purpose of a variance procedure is to protect the landowner from
confiscatory actions by a governing body. If properly utilized, the pro-
blems engendered by Euclidian zoning should not arise; however, past ex-
perience has indicated the contrary. Therefore, a mechanism must be
created to insure that recognizable standards are developed and followed
when granting or denying a variance.
G. Subdivision Controls
Land subdivision controls, instead of looking at large scale or regional
planning problems, concentrate on local development. 90 It is through this
mechanism that a municipality can evaluate a project and determine how
that project or similar projects will develop. With effective subdivision
regulation and the trend towards private development of large areas, a
municipality is given an opportunity to fashion the manner in which
facilities will be utilized at the lowest possible cost. The municipality is
also given the chance to prescribe regulations as to the design and layout
of subdivisions. Additionally, the municipality is allowed to more effi-
ciently allocate facilities and services and make determinations as to the
timing and sequence of growth. Growth control is subject to the caveat
that growth can neither be unreasonably hampered nor can certain uses
or users be completely excluded. 91
188. MLDC, supra note 42, at § 2-202.
189. The emphasis on economic analysis has at least one meritorious characteristic:
relative ease of ascertainment as compared to standards of "reasonableness" or "general
welfare."
190. One method of regulating subdivisions is through recording statutes, which is the
method which exists in Iowa. See IOWA CODE ch. 409 (1971). See also Cunningham, supra note
8, at 415-437; Note, Subdivision Regulations in Iowa, 54 IOWA L. REV. 1121 (1969).
191. See, e.g., Construction Industry Assoc. v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 586
(N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 552 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Golden
v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
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Due to the trend in the private sector to develop large areas, it is
necessary that a municipality become involved in the subdivision process
in order to make the most efficient economic use of its resources,
facilities and services. Poor subdivision development can easily result in
a depreciation of property values as well as increased service costs which
ultimately result in higher property taxes. Ideally, a municipality and the
private developer will cooperate so their mutual interest can be effective-
ly satisfied.'92 The municipality's interests are in keeping an attractive
community and taxes reasonable, i.e., high enough for municipal purposes
but palatable to the citizenry. If taxes become prohibitive for the lan-
downer, certain land uses fall into disrepair resulting in a blighted area.
A municipality is additionally interested in providing services and
facilities as efficiently as possible. The developer is interested in a low
development cost in order to keep his property at a marketable price.
Once subdivision requirements are installed, due to their permanent
nature, any change is costly if not prohibitive.
Thus, planning, zoning and subdivision functions should interrelate in
order that the most efficient land use mechanism can be developed.
Participation of the planning commission in the formulation of both the
zoning and subdivision regulation is calculated to insure considerable
degree of comformity between them and with the master plan (if any)....
"The standards in the subdivision ordinance with respect to minimal
lot sizes and lot area requirements shall be identical with the provisions
of the zoning ordinance. Where a zoning ordinance contains no such provi-
sions or where there is not such ordinance, the standards including
minimum lot sizes and lot area requirements shall be specified in the sub-
division ordinance." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40.55-1.15 (Supp. 1963). Thus, the
agency which has the power to regulate land subdivision becomes, in ef-
fect, the initial enforcement agency with respect to minimum lot size and
area zoning regulations or in the unusual case where there is no zoning
ordinance or the zoning ordinance contains no such regulations-the zon-
ing agency.'93
Subdivision regulation need not rigidly fix area and bulk requirements. In
fact, subdivision ordinances can be given great flexibility by vesting the
planning authority or zoning commission with the power to vary bulk and
density restrictions within the zoning regulations for subdivisions. The
average residential density must be maintained, taking the entire area of
the subdivided tract into account. Such divisions are referred to as
192. One recurring theme in dealing with land use controls is that without proper plan-
ning, administrative costs can become excessive to the point where the developer can no
longer effectively pass through these costs to the purchaser. When this occurs everyone
loses: the consumer acquires an unsatisfactory product; the developer's profit is reduced (or
he incurs losses); and the municipality does not maximize its tax base due to a poor quality
development. The immediate ripple effect is that the rest of the residences must make up the
deficit.
193. Cunningham, supra note 8, at 435-36.
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cluster zones or P.U.D.'s and are designed to permit development at a
somewhat higher density than otherwise allowed per single-lot develop-
ment. Such schemes will provide sizeable areas of common open space.' 4
Normally, it is the planning agency that drafts and implements the
subdivision ordinances. Although such procedure existed in Iowa under
Chaper 373, since its repeal, a serious gap in administration may current-
ly exist. 9" Nevertheless, basic statutory authority for the regulation of
subdivision is found in the state platting act'" which is directed to the
subdivider and requires subdivision when the land is divided into three
or more parts.
A municipality is given the authority to require the subdivider to con-
form streets with existing streets and blocks, and to install sidewalks,
paving, sewers, water, gas and electric utilities before a plat is ap-
proved.'97 The developer may also be required, in lieu of immediate in-
stallation, to post a surety bond to secure the construction or installation
of improvements within a fixed time.199 Thus, a municipality has extensive
authority over the subdivider and may, in fact, control the design and
layout of a particular plat for the purpose of insuring orderly growth and
development.'9 9
194. See Henke, Planned Unit Developments and Land Use Intensity, 114 U. PA. L.
REV. 65 (1960); Goldston & Scherer, Zoning of Planned Residential Developments, 73 HARv.
L. REV. 241 (1959); see also Chrinko v. South Brunswick Township Planning Bd., 77 N.J.
Super. 594, 187 A.2d 221 (1963).
195. IOWA CODE ch. 373 (1974) (repealed effective July 1, 1975). The repeal of chapter
373 does not mean that a city may not adopt a planning commission. However, there is less
incentive for a city to do so.
196. IOWA CODE ch. 409 (1977).
197. IOWA CODE §§ 409.4-.5 (1977).
198. Id § 409.14.
199. See generally Freilich & Levi, Model Regulations for the Control of Land Subdivi-
sion, 36 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1971). The authors view subdivision controls as a flexible tool:
The traditional method for controlling urban development has been "Euclidean"
zoning. But zoning is based upon the supposition that it is possible, by careful in-
tellectual effort, to determine optimum land use long before actual development.
The use of subdivision regulations allows consideration of an application for
development by an administrative body which exercises ad hoc judgments and bas-
ed on standards in pre-stated regulations. Each application is handled as a unique
development. The procedure for subdivision approval is comparable to modern
techniques of flexible zoning-floating zones, planned unit developments, special per-
mits, incentive zoning and cluster developments-in that an administrative agency
(the Planning Commission) renders determinations when each application is filled.
The use of subdivision regulations is more relevant to today's problems than is
zoning. The fast-moving shift of population to sprawling suburban environments
threatens the utilization of every existing acre of land without adequate provisions
for community facilities and no consideration for preservation of woodlands,
streams and fresh air. Development has become so rapid in many areas that there
is on longer time to adopt fixed and permanent master plans which will regulate in
predetermined fashion every step of a community's development. The rapid pace of
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While subdivision controls are held to be within the police power of
the state,0 ° the extent to which a municipality may require a subdivider
to develop his land raises the issue of whether the requirements are un-
constitutionally burdensome and thus constituting a taking."
The simple requirement of having the streets graded in a certain
fashion or certain design layouts have been accepted generally.
Municipalities, through their subdivision ordinances, have also required
the developer to make monetary contributions to the school system, or
for parks, or other facilities in excess of the needs of the subdivision.
Such compulsory dedications for off-site controls run a greater risk of be-
ing ruled unconstitutional.
The law of subdivision controls in Iowa could benefit by structuring it
to be more than a recording device. This could be accomplished by en-
couraging or requiring the establishment of a planning board to develop
and administer subdivision controls. Such a law might also allow the
board to exercise authority over site plans, thus fostering flexibility in
municipal planning.
H. Judicial Review
Appeals from the board of adjustment are explicitly regulated by
statute and are taken to the district court by writ of certiorari. 2 Ad-
ministrative remedies must be exhausted if the appeal concerns the ap-
plication of a zoning ordinance to the complainant's property."' An or-
modern urbanization requires flexible decision-making tied to rational planning
policies.
The technique of subdivision regulations gives the governing unit one of its
most potent means to coordinate the demands for new development with the
demands for essential facilities. Full use of subdivision regulations also provides a
means to put into operation the environmental and aesthetic considerations which
are today so much a part of the American man's concept of "the good life."
Id at 3-4 (footnotes omitted). Included in the article are detailed regulations. Id. at 31-76. See
also Landau, Urban Concentration and Land Exactions For Recreational Use: Some Con-
stitutional Problems in Mandatory Dedication Ordinances in Iowa, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 71
(1972); R. FREILICH & P. LEVI. MODEL SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS (1975).
200. See Reps, Control of Land Subdivision by Municipal Planning Boards, 40 CORNELL
L. REV. 258, 280 (1955); Note, Platting, Planning & Protection-A Summary of Subdivision
Statutes, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1205 (1961). See also STANDARD ENABLING PLANNING ACT §§ 2, 12,
13 (1928). See Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, __, 198 A.
225, 229 (1938) (this case is also notable for its discussion of the different functions of the
planning board and the board of adjustment).
201. See Johnston, The Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest
for a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 871, 873 (1967); Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality
of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision
Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 119 (1964). See also Divan Builders Inc. v. Planning Bd., 66 N.J. 582,
334 A.2d 30 (1975); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966); Subdivision Note, supra note 28, 1126-27.
202. IOWA CODE §§ 414.15, 358A.18 (1977).
203. See, e.g, Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
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dinance may be attacked on its face as being unconstitutional directly in
district court without exhausting administrative remedies.'
Once jurisdiction of the district court in invoked, the burden is on the
challenger to prove that the ordinance, which is presumptively valid, is
unconstitutional-either as applied or on its face. 5 There exists an in-
creasing body of authority that the burden of proof is shifting to the
municipality in that it must justify and substantiate the reasons why an
owner of land has been denied the use to which he seeks to put his pro-
perty."' In Iowa, one who challenges a zoning ordinance has the burden
of asserting its invalidity and must prove that it is unreasonable, ar-
bitrary, capricious or discriminatory.1 7 This generally occurs when the or-
dinance is attacked as being unconstitutional and in conflict with the due
process or equal protection clauses." 8 The test of arbitrariness or
unreasonableness is whether the means used have any substantial rela-
tionship to public health, safety or general welfare,"' e.g., does a height
limitation or a prohibition of fast food restaurants further the objectives
of the zoning ordinance? If so, the challenge becomes whether the or-
dinance is consistent with the enabling legislation.
Ordinances are strictly construed.210 The presumption of validity is
strong and the courts have interpreted the presumption to meant that if
the ordinance is facially valid and the reasonableness of the ordinance is
"fairly debatable," it must stand.2 1' The courts have stated that they will
not substitute their judgment for an action by a city or town acting
204. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926).
205. RATHKOPF, supra note 45, at 21-1 to 21-41.
206. In Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971), the
court, in discussing an attempt by a municipality to exclude a mobile home park said:
"Therefore, in such limited situations, the proponent of a preferred or protected but pro-
hibited use may establish a prima facie case thereby casting upon the municipality the
burden of going forward to justify its prohibition of a use heretofore recognized as beneficial
to the public welfare." Id. at __ , 192 N.W.2d at 325. See Kropf v. Sterling Heights, 391
Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974) (the longevity of Kropf was short; see Kirk v. Township of
Tyrone, 398 Mich. 429, 247 N.W.2d 848 (1976); Sabo v. Township of Monroe, 394 Mich. 531,
232 N.W.2d 584 (1975); Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Windsor Charter Twp., __ Mich. __ , 256
N.W.2d 791 (Ct. App. 1977)); Southern Burlington Co. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); Baker v. City of Milwaukie, 533 P.2d 772 (Ore. 1975); Fasano
v. Board of Co. Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Ore. 1973); Lawley v. Town of Golfview, 174 So. 2d 767
(Fla. Ct. App. 1965).
207. See Hermann v. City of Des Moines, 250 Iowa 1281, 1284, 97 N.W.2d 893, 895
(1959).
208. See, e.g., Plaza Recreational Center v. Sioux City, 253 Iowa 246, 251, 111 N.W.2d
758, 762 (1961).
209. Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 66 N.W.2d 113 (1954).
210. Anderson v. City of Cedar Rapids, 168 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Iowa 1969); Livingston v.
Davis, 243 Iowa 21, 26, 50 N.W.2d 592, 596 (1951).
211. Anderson v. City of Cedar Rapids, 168 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Iowa 1969); Smith v. City
of Fort Dodge, 160 N.W.2d 492, 495 (Iowa 1968); Stoner McCray System v. City of Des
Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 1318, 78 N.W.2d 843, 847 (1956).
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reasonably within the scope of the police power.212 A zoning ordinance
will be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power once the courts
finds that is in the interest of the public peace, morals, health, safety,
convenience and the general welfare. 3
A developer who applies for a rezoning, an amendment, or even a
variance must show that the proposed use comports with the
municipality's plan. Under the developing shifting burden of proof doc-
trine, the township, must do more than merely deny relief in the belief
that the proposal is not in the municipality's interest; it must identify the
reasons why relief is denied.
What is or is not reasonable is often difficult to ascertain. In Jaffe v.
City of Davenport,"" the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the rezoning of a
tract from residential single family to commercial because of the cir-
cumstances and the suitability of the land for commercial rather than
residential use. The court stated that this conclusion was fairly debatable
and did not violate the comprehensive plan; therefore, the rezoning was
held to be a valid exercise of police power. Note how easy it would have
been for the municipality to have denied the rezoning request, saying
that the land was suitable for residential development. In this situation,
because of the scope of the court's review, the result is the same, i.e.,
either a decision to allow commercial or residential use could have been
upheld. This suggests a wide latitude for the exercise of decision making
on behalf of a municipal body.
Judicial review by the district court and the supreme court is de
novo."5 This is a de novo review of the record, however, and issues must
have been presented below in order to be preserved." Again, it must be
noted that one who attacks such legislation on constitutional grounds has
the burden of pleading its invalidity and unreasonableness and assumes
the burden to negate every reasonable basis upon which the ordinance
may be sustained.""
In appeals from decisions of administrative tribunals, plaintiffs
generally have the heavy burden of showing that such tribunal exceeded
its proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.1 8
212. Anderson v. City of Cedar Rapids, 168 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Iowa 1969); Brackett v.
City of Des Moines, 246 Iowa 249, 67 N.W.2d 542, 548 (1954).
213. Jersild v. Sarcone, 260 Iowa 288, 292, 149 N.W.2d 179, 183 (1967).
214. 179 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa 1970).
215. Weldon v. Zoning Bd., 250 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1977); Cole v. City of Osceola, 179
N.W.2d 524 (Iowa 1970).
216. Cole v. City of Osceola, 179 N.W.2d 524, 527 (Iowa 1970). See Johnson v. Board of
Adjustment, 239 N.W.2d 873 (Iowa 1976).
217. Cole v. City of Osceola, 179 N.W.2d 524, 528 (Iowa 1970).
218. Trailer City, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 218 N.W.2d 645, 646-47 (Iowa 1974).
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Cases presented with the issue of the scope of the state supreme
court's review are not in accord."1 9 The Iowa Supreme Court has attemp-
ted to define the scope of its review.
The term "de novo" as used in either section [358A.21 and 414.18]
does not bear its equitable connotation. It authorizes the taking of addi-
tional testimony, but only for the submission and consideration of those
questions of illegality raised by the statutory petition for writ of cer-
tiorari. Upon the hearing to determine such questions the trial court, as
both sections 414.18 and 358A.21 provide, ". . . may reverse or affirm,
wholly or partly, or may modify the decision brought up for review." The
action of the trial court has the effect of a jury verdict and is appealable
to us on assigned errors only.n'
The lesson to be learned for the developer should be clear. The case
must be made at the municipal level. For the municipality, although its
role is minimal now, its decisions must also be supportable.
V. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Iowa, unlike the more densely populated states, is fortunate in that
the effects of poor land use planning are not yet critical. This does not
mean that Iowa does not need improved planning methods. Iowa's tradi-
tional role of being a leading supplier of the nation's agricultural products
is dependent upon the wide expanses of grade "A" land reserved solely
for agricultural purposes."' However, this interest has come into direct
conflict with Iowa's growing population and other factors which are com-
peting for the use of this limited amount of land.' Iowa, at this point, is
faced with two alternatives: Iowa can follow the unfortunate examples of
those states which discovered, too late, the irreversible effects, both en-
vironmentally and socially, that accompany rapid and haphazard land
development; or Iowa can choose to designate priorities in the form of a
land use policy and implement a plan to coordinate competing land uses.
Iowa's evaluation of a statewide land use policy began in 1971 with a
resolution which requested that the Iowa Legislative Council establish a
study of land use policies and related planning procedures for the state
219. Compare Vogelaar v. Polk Co. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 188 N.W.2d 860 (Iowa
1971) with Buchholz v. Board of Adjustment, 199 N.W.2d 73 (Iowa 1972). See Weldon v. Zon-
ing Bd., 250 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1977).
220. Trailer City, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 218 N.W.2d 645, 647-48 (Iowa 1974).
221. In 1971, the Legislative Council of the Sixty-fourth General Assembly of Iowa
created the Land Use Policies Study Committee (LUPSC) for the purpose of taking testimony
from representatives of private industry and governmental agencies concerning land use pro-
blems and practices and the need for a statewide land use policy. See Minutes: LUPSC at 1
(Oct. 20-21, 1971) (statement of Robert Mickle); Minutes: LUPSC at 3 (Nov. 9-10, 1971) (state-
ment of William H. Greiner).
222. According to 1970 census figures Iowa has a state population of 2,824,376, over a
third of which is centered in the state's five largest cities (Des Moines-286,101; Cedar Rapids-
163,213; Davenport-142,687; Waterloo-132,916; and Sioux City-103,052).
223. H. Con. Res. 25, 64th G.A., 1st Sess. (1971).
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and make recommendations to the Sixty-fifth General Assembly."3 In
compliance with this resolution, the Legislative Council created the Land
Use Policies Study Committee.
The primary focus of the initial Land Use Policies Study Committee
was to determine the desirability of a statewide land use plan for Iowa;
and if desirable, what should constitute the basic element of such a plan.
A general consensus of the Committee favored the development of such a
plan and gave the following reasons for this decision:"2
1) To provide for the use of land for the purpose for which it is best
suited.... [m
2) To protect those land areas that have special geologic, aesthetic,
scenic, scientific, and historic value.['l
3) To protect landowners from having their property taken for pur-
poses other than for which it is best suited.li
224. Final Report: LUPSC at 2 (1972).
225. Primarily, a land use policy would assist the state in realizing the maximum
benefits from its land by designating uses of land according to the land's highest potential.
Agricultural production, industrial, recreational, residential and other forms of land use
which all compete for limited surface area do not require the same physical characteristics.
Proper planning would reduce the occasions of senseless overlap, e.g., the zoning for in-
dustrial development on mineral-rich soil when agricultural use is more efficient. At the same
time, proper planning could allow for a temporary overlap of land uses which would not be ir-
reversible thereby providing a degree of flexibility. For example, if a highly productive piece
of land is not presently needed for agricultural purposes, it may be converted temporarily for
recreational purposes in the form of a park or nature trails. Such convertibility is desirable in
view of the fact that the amount of land used for agricultural production has become less
critical in recent years due to modern agricultural production methods. See Minutes: LUPSC
at 3-4 and 6-7 (Oct. 20-21, 1971) (see statements of Lauren Soth and Frank E. Horton);
Minutes: LUPSC at 1-3 (Nov. 9-10, 1971) (statement of David L. Trauger). See also Gordon,
"Recreational Carrying iapacity-Estimation and Use," LAND USE PLANNING SEMINAR:
Focus ON IOWA (1973); [hereinafter cited as Focus ON IOWA]; Thompson "Land Production and
Land Use Planning and Control," Focus ON IOWA, supra.
226. It is also the purpose of any land use plan to take into consideration the many
needs and elements which cannot be classified under the economic headings of production
and development. See also IOWA CODE §§ 303.20-.33 (1977) which established a mechanism for
the preservation of historical districts.
227. Instead of taking away certain freedoms, a land use policy is more likely to
preserve certain rights and freedoms by guaranteeing the individual that the best use of his
land will not be severely devalued by incompatible uses of surrounding lands. By eliminating
notions of "rugged individualism" in regard to land use, and by making clear that legal
ownership does not entitle one to an inalienable right to use or misuse the land in any way
he chooses, a land use policy is in fact protecting us from an infringement on our freedom as
a result of one's misuse of land. See Minutes: LUPSC at 3 (Nov. 9-10, 1971) (statements of
William Greiner).
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4) To coordinate the manner in which public agencies make decisions
concerning land use.i-l
5) To provide for adequate study of the short-term and long-term ef-
fects (ecologic, economic, and social) of land conversions from present use
to another use, especially any nonreversible use, before such conversions
are madell
The Committee concluded that in order to assure orderly growth and
development in the state consistent with a desirable environment, im-
mediate efforts were needed to acquire a more complete understanding of
land use needs in Iowa. In the absence of any specific legislative proposal,
the Committee made its final recommendation that a land use policy
should be formulated by:
1) Development of a statement setting forth the need for a land use
policy.
2) Development of guidelines setting forth the different kinds of land
and how land should be used in the best interests of the landowners
and the public.
3) [Suggestion of] methods to be used in carrying out the land use
guidelines.'
A 1972 Committee continued and broadened the inquiries of its
predecessor as to the desirability of a state land policy. From the
regional public hearings conducted by the 1972 Committee, it became ap-
parent that most who attended wanted a land use policy as soon as possi-
ble, but not statewide zoning. In other words, while the majority would
228. The impact of individual, autonomous land use decisions go far beyond the im-
mediate parties involved. Even the smallest decisions to maintain or change a particular land
use may have present or future effects on the region or the state. Therefore, a land use
policy is needed to reduce the chance that the benefits derived from a particular decision of
one community will not later act to the detriment of another community. This process of
coordination is one of the primary concerns of these legislative attempts to implement a land
use policy.
229. Iowa is the state with the least amount of land topographically mapped for
geological and hydrological purposes. With less than 46% of the land mapped, a top priority
in the implementation of a land use policy should be to identify all potential natural resources
within the state. See Minutes: LUPSC at 9 (Oct. 20-21, 1971) (statement of Samuel J. Tuthill).
Once a better understanding of the geographical make-up of the state is acquired, then
Iowa will be better equipped to obviate the concerns of many who fear that the conversion of
one land use into another will be irreversible in the future. Minutes: LUPSC at 6 (Oct. 20-21,
1971) (statement of Frank E. Horton). An expanding population will require that land not
presently being used be converted for urban or transportation purposes, but proper planning
can help to insure that lands rich in natural resources or agricultural potential will be main-
tained for such purposes while land less valuable in those terms may be converted for other
uses. Minutes: LUPSC at 3 (Oct. 20-21, 1971) (statement of Lauren Soth). Specifically, in
regard to transportation, a land use policy may encourage efforts to improve present primary
and secondary highways in the state rather than irreversibly converting other land into new
highway systems. Minutes: LUPSC at 1 (Nov. 9-10, 1971) (statement of David Trauger).
230. Minutes: LUPSC (Dec. 22, 1971).
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support land use guidelines implemented under local supervision or con-
trol, they did not support any specific statutory controls.
Repeatedly, there were attempts to distinguish the feasibility and
need of a statewide land use policy from the concept of zoning. This
distinction was necessary due to the overwhelming dissatisfaction with
the results of state, county and local zoning measures. The criticism of
zoning is that it lacks specific guidelines and it does not touch upon the
natural resource concerns, even though it does serve a political, economic
or social purpose on a local or regional basis."'
Another major concern was the role that a land use policy plays in
regard to urbanization. Those who strongly advocate the preservation of
Iowa's agricultural land state that this could only be accomplished by a
policy that directs itself to the problems of industrial development and
urbanization. 3 ' For example, urban development on the fringe of our
larger cities is already a crucial problem. In this respect, a land use policy
would be instrumental in preserving Iowa's agricultural land while con-
trolling urban sprawl. However, the purpose of a land use policy would
not be to limit or diminish urbanization, but rather, to plan for a healthy
coexistence of urban and rural need. A land use policy would help to iden-
tify the land areas best suited for rural purposes and the area where ur-
ban development should continue.
In concluding its work, the 1972 Committee recommended the enact-
ment of a bill creating a state land use policy commission."' The bill was
to be process-oriented in that a state commission was to be formed for
the purpose of developing a state land use policy and then making
legislative recommendations to the General Assembly.' The proposed
commission had no substantive authority.
There was not the necessary support of the Legislature for creation
of this commission. However, the first step toward the creation of a
modern statewide land use policy had been taken and significant concepts
were developed. First, the state commission proposal established the goal
of formulating state wide land use controls to be used at least as guides
231. Minutes: LUPSC at 1-3 (Nov. 17, 1972).
232. Minutes: LUPSC (May 8, 1972) (statement of Dr. Burl Al Parks). For example,
land which is highly suitable for agricultural purposes is also highly suited for industrial
development-the land is reasonably level, requiring very little grading, and its structure
would easily support the buildings and structures needed for industrialization. With the ur-
ban population expanding while the rural population decreases in Iowa, it is obvious that ur-
banization will increase at the expense of increased consumption of agricultural land. The
land in rural communities within commuting distance of urban areas is a likely candidate for
use by a developer. It is in the interest of these communities to adopt a comprehensive land
use policy in order to effectuate an orderly growth plan before inefficient and perhaps ir-
reversible development occurs.
233. H.F. 65, 65th G.A., 1st Sess. (1972).
234. I& at § 3.
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for local controls. Secondly, the proposed commission was to be given
wide latitude to identify and evaluate land use problems in Iowa,m and to
prepare legislative proposals in a number of substantive and procedural
areas such as state review of local plans and state regulation of large
scale development.-
Building primarily upon the information received from the previous
committees, the 1973 Committee1 stated that its primary objective
would be to draft legislation which would prepare and implement a state
land use policy in order to guide state agencies, counties, cities and
special districts in making land use decisions. In this attempt, the 1973
Committee operated on the premise that most decisions affecting the use
of land are only of local concern; therefore, the administration and en-
forcement of land use decisions should be left to local government, except
in the case of large scale developments, key public facilities and areas of
critical concern which, because of their size or impact, affect several
political subdivisions or the state as a whole.'
The Committee gave special attention to Senate Bill 268, "The Land
Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act of 1973," which had been passed
by the United States Senate.' This proposed bill, if passed, would have
provided more than $100 million each year for eight years in grants to
assist states in developing and carrying out land use programs. As the
1973 Committee realized, not only is it in Iowa's best interest to for-
mulate a land use policy, but also, the cost of implementation might be
alleviated through federal funding. Although Senate Bill 268 was not
enacted by Congress, there was recognized a need to shift power from
virtually total local control to state control with possible federal in-
fluence.
The 1973 Committee moved in the direction of substantive rather
than procedural change. In expanding upon the previous Committees'
work, it essentially retained the concept of a state land use agency but
sought to vest that agency with more substantive authority.
In order to facilitate its preparation of legislative proposals, the Com-
mittee divided into three subcommittees. The first was the Subcommittee
on State Organization and Guidelines. ' This subcommittee was charged
with the duty of determining what kind of state agency should administer
the state's land use policy. The subcommittee formulated four alter-
natives for the organization of the state land use agency:
235. Id at § 8.
236. 1i at § 9.
237. H. Con. Res. 66, 65th G.A., 1st Sess. (1973).
238. Final Report of LUPSC (Jan. 1974).
239. Minutes: LUPSC at 2 (Aug. 23, 1973).
240. Minutes: LUPSC at 4 (Sept. 17, 1973).
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1) A temporary agency similar to that recommended by the 1972
Land Use Study Committee;
2) A combination of several existing departments that relate to land
use;
3) A new department created to administer the land use policy; and
4) An expansion of the existing Department of Soil Conservation."'
In its final recommendation to the Committee, the Subcommittee was
unable to come to a decision on whether an entirely new agency should
be created or whether the Department of Soil Conservation should be ex-
panded to include the administration of a land use policy. The members
appeared to favor the latter.""2 According to the Subcommittee, whatever
form of agency was ultimately used, it would be responsible for
establishing guidelines and policies for a department of land use. It would
also be responsible for developing statewide land use goals, land use plan-
ning guidelines for local governments, issuing permits for critical areas
and activities, preparing inventories and land use tax studies and review-
ing and approving the land use plans of state agencies and local govern-
ments.4 8
The second subcommittee was the Subcommittee on Critical Areas.2" '
The stated purpose of this Subcommittee was to formulate specific
legislative recommendations relating to the protection of critical areas
such as strip mines, prime agricultural land, historical sites and fragile
lands including wetlands and woodlands." ' For example, in regard to
strip mining, it was recommended that the General Assembly insure that
mined land is restored for agricultural or recreational purposes. The need
for this protection is great in view of the energy crisis and Iowa's abun-
dant supply of coal.2 "
The final subcommittee was the Subcommittee on Local Implementa-
tion.4 7 In accordance with the 1973 Committee's basic tenet that the local
nature and impact of land use decisions calls for a local agency to imple-
ment policies, the primary objective of this Subcommittee was to deter-
mine the composition and structure of that local agency.4 8
241. Minutes: LUPSC at 2 (Oct. 4-5, 1973).
242. Minutes: Subcommittee on State Organization and Guidelines, LUPSC (Oct. 4,
1973).
243. I& It should be noted how this is different from what was proposed by the 1971
and 1972 Study Committees. Basically, it differs from the previous proposals in that it is ask-
ing the land use committee for more than just recommendations. In H.F. 65 the land use com-
mission was temporary and was to be used to recommend legislative proposals whereas in
this 1973 proposal it would be given certain decision making and policy making authority.
H.F. 65, 65th G.A., 1st Sess. (1972).
244. Minutes: LUPSC at 4 (Sept. 17, 1973).
245. Minutes: Subcommittee on Critical Areas 1, LUPSC (Sept. 18, 1973).
246. Id
247. Minutes: Subcommittee on State Organization 4, LUPSC (Sept. 17, 1973).
248. Minutes: Subcommittee on Local Implementation 1, LUPSC (Sept. 18, 1973).
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It was the general concensus of this Subcommittee that local land use
decisions usually had at least a regional impact and that the nuclear unit
for local implementation of a state land use policy should be the county. "
Each county would have a county-wide land use policy agency. The prin-
cipal duties of which, subject to state guidelines, would be to study the
resources of the county and develop a comprehensive plan which included
such matters as solid waste disposal; sewage treatment; water supply;
flood plain controls; designation of industrial, recreational, residential,
commercial development and feedlot areas; designation of woodland,
scenic, historic and other natural areas of local significance; provision for
a transportation system; and annexation controls.'
Having received the final recommendations from the three subcom-
mittees, the 1973 Committee continued to work on its legislative proposal
which was the final product of the year's study. The final draft of the pro-
posed bill was completed and recommended for enactment. The proposed
bill was introduced as House File 1422.01 The bill was amended and pass-
ed by the House of Representatives during the 1974 Session of the Sixty-
fifth General Assembly. House File 1422 is the basic document for a com-
prehensive land use bill in Iowa. " ' Wide ranging guidelines and policy ob-
jectives were ennunciated within which the State Commission was to
act.,
249. Minutes: Subcommittee on Local Implementation 2, LUPSC (Oct. 4, 1973).
250. Minutes: Subcommittee on Local Implementation 3, LUPSC (Oct. 31, 1973).
251. H.F. 1422, 65th G.A., 2d Sess. (1974).
252. The following summarizes the recommendations of the 1973 Land Use Policies
Study Committee as introduced in H.F. 1422:
1. To create a state land use agency for the purpose of the creation, implementa-
tion and administration of a state land use filing;
2. To provide for the creation of county commissions to assist the state commis-
sion in its functions;
3. To provide for the preparation and revision of a state inventory of land and
natural resources and of data related to population trends, economic characteristics,
environmental trends and the directions and extent of urban and rural growth;
4. To provide assistance to counties and municipalities for development of com-
prehensive plans;
5. Designation of state "areas of critical concern" which include fragile or historic
lands; natural hazard lands; designation of "key facilities" such as airports, major
highways and public utilities; and designation of "large scale development" or
renewable resource lands of more than local concern;
6. To establish procedural rules for the review of county and local land use deci-
sions.
7. Creation of. for areas of critical concern, key facilities and large scale develop-
ment;
8. Comprehensive plans for land use must be prepared, adopted and promulgated
by state agencies, counties, cities and special districts;
9. Appeal procedures for persons aggrieved by state, county and local decisions.
H.F. 1422, 65th G.A., 2d Sess. (1974).
253. 1d. at § 9.
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Thus, the efforts of the 1973 Committee were productive from the
standpoint that the extensive legislation it had drafted was passed by the
House of Representatives. The bill created a state agency and a
statewide land use planning organization to implement policy according
to guidelines provided by the state agency for local units. House File
1422 was a formidable bill in that it established a feasible system for the
implementation of a state land use policy while remaining compatible
with the national bill (S. 268) in order to qualify for federal grants-in-aid
should they become available.2
The focus of House File 1422 and subsequent legislation is not incom-
patible with local control of land use policy. In the first instance, the
state commission seeks to undertake an omnibus study of land use needs
and develop a statewide plan. However, implementation of the plan is
localized at the county level. More importantly, the development permits
authorized by the state are limited to certain designated areas of "critical
concern," "key facilities," or "large scale development." Local munici-
palities retain their planning, zoning and subdivision powers with the ad-
ded responsibility of adoption of a comprehensive plan. Theoretically, this
division of authority is convenient. On the one hand the municipalities
still possess significant controls over local issues. On the other hand, the
state, through the counties, tackles the more sensitive and sophisticated
planning issues that are likely to have a regional impact.
The 1974 Committee reviewed amendments to House File 1422 and
began plans to prepare a revised bill to be introduced during the 1975
Session of the Sixty-sixth General Assembly.2" In analyzing House File
1422, minor criticisms were made. First, it was suggested that state land
use coordination responsibility should be placed somewhere other than in
the Department of Soil Conservation. Secondly, it was argued that a
number of sections of House File 1422 did not adequately protect the in-
terest of cities.' Finally, criticism was made of any legislative proposal,
such as House File 1422, which was developed without regard for such
factors as current air and water pollution control guidelines from the
federal Environmental Protection Agency. 7
House File 1422 was applauded for its method of implementation
which allowed for "bottom-up" planning similar to the federal land use
bill and the MLDC; it stresses the grass roots approach: state guidelines,
state control of critical areas, but with the majority of planning and en-
forcement at the local levels of government. The combination of
statewide land use policies with as much local control as possible was
254. Minutes: LUPSC at 1 (Aug. 23, 1973).
255. Final Report: LUPSC (Dec. 1974).
256. Minutes: LUPSC at 1 (Sept. 19, 1974) (statement of Robert E. Josten).
257. Id
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overwhelmingly favored over the creation of an autonomous "top-down"
planning authority.'
After reviewing its findings, the 1974 Committee recommended a bill
which was introduced as House File 58.59 After review and study by the
House Committee on Natural Resources, a new draft, House File 505, was
introduced and subsequently amended and passed by the House.'
House File 505 was substantially similar to House File 1422, with only
minor changes. As amended and passed by the House, it provided, as did
House File 1422, for a standard land use policy and also creates a depart-
ment of soil conservation and land use, a state land use policy commission
and county land use policy commissions. Additionally, it specified the
powers and duties of such agencies.
During the 1975 Session of the Sixty-sixth General Assembly, a 1975
Land Use Study Committee was established, primarily to draw together
and review land use legislative proposals that had been brought before
both the House of Representatives and the Senate."1 The 1975 Committee
determined the major issues and differences in four land use proposals in-
troduced or filed during the 1975 Session of the Sixty-sixth General
Assembly. The four proposals selected for comparison included House
File 505 as amended, Senate Amendment S-3988, Senate Amendment
S-4147, and House Amendment H-3465. The 1975 Committee also con-
sidered House Amendment H-3506 which specifically amended provisions
of House File 505 relating to an intermediate land use policy commis-
sion." '2 Finally, the 1975 Committee approved House File 505 as amended.
During 1976, the House of Representatives did not offer new land use
legislation, but the Senate, through its Committee on Natural Resources,
introduced Senate File 1313.' The substance of this bill was similar to
those previously before the House and Senate. Also, the bill called for im-
plementation of a state land preservation commission, which was similar
to the commissions which were established under House File 505 except
for some minor changes in the numbers and qualifications of members.
The bill incorporated a definite time schedule and method of procedure
for the development of a state land "preservation" policy.'
258. Minutes: LUPSC at 1 (Sept. 19, 1974) (statement of William H. Greiner).
259. Final Report: LUPSC (Nov., 1975).
260. Il
261. Minutes: LUPSC at 2 (Oct. 1, 1975).
262. Final Report: LUPSC (Nov. 7, 1975). The major differences discussed by the Study
Committee were primarily organizational. For example, three of the proposals (H-3465,
S-4147, and S-3988) provided for the creation of an independent state agency, while H.F. 505
provided for the reorganization of the Department of Soil Conservation. See H-3465 (House
Amendment to H.F. 505) and S-4147, S-3988 (Senate Amendment to H.F. 505), 66th G.A., 2d
Sess. (1976); H.F. 505, 66th G.A., 2d Sess. (1976). There were also differences concerning
membership and qualifications on the state commission.
263. S. 1313, 66th G.A., 2d Sess. (1976).
264. Id- at § 8.
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The House of Representatives, evidently satisfied with the ideas ex-
pressed in the amended House File 505 which had failed to receive the re-
quisite approval of the entire General Assemby, passed House File 210 in
early 1977."' House File 210 was identical to House File 505 as to the
agencies created and their specified powers and duties. House File 210
was passed by the House but virtually amended out of existence by the
Senate.2 "
Basically, the State Land Preservation Policy Act is a holding action
which establishes two temporary commissions to study and recommend a
land preservation policy. 67 First, it creates a Temporary County Land
265. H.R. 210, 67th G.A., 1st Sess. (1977).
266. H-3931 (Senate Amendment to H.R. 210), 67th G.A., 1st Sess. (House Clip Sheet
May 4, 1977). On June 30, 1977, Governor Ray signed the amended version of H.R. 210 into
law, see Land Preservation, H.F. 210, 1977 Iowa Leg. Serv. 227 (West) (to be codified in the
IOWA CODE) [hereinafter cited as State Land Preservation Policy Act].
267. It is the intent of the general assembly of the state of Iowa to provide for the
development of land preservation policy recommendations for the consideration of
the general assembly through a process that emphasizes the participation and
recommendations of citizens and local governments. The general assembly intends
to provide for the development of recommendations which will provide for the
orderly use and development of land and related natural resources in Iowa,
preserve private property rights, preserve the use of prime agricultural land for
agricultural production, preserve, guide the development of critical areas, key
facilities and large-scale development, and provide for the future housing, commer-
cial, industrial and recreational needs of the state.
State Land Preservation Policy Act, supra note 266 at § 1. Compare the Act's legislative in-
tent with that of H.R. 210, 67th G.A., 1st Sess. § 1 (1977).
IT]o provide for the orderly use and development of land and related natural
resources in Iowa, to preserve the use of prime agricultural land for agricultural
production, to preserve natural, cultural and historical areas, to provide for future
housing, commercial, industrial and recreational needs and for such other uses as
needed, to provide for the coordination of comprehensive plans for land use, and to
control urban sprawl and to preserve and renew the urban core, and thereby pro-
vide for the protection and preservation of the private and public interest in the
land, water, and related resources of this state for the public health, safety and
general welfare, and for the benefit of przesent and future generations.
Land use decisions should rest primarily at the local government level. It is
the intent of the general assembly that a state land use policy provide maximum
emphasis on the local development of land use goals and objectives, local develop-
ment of comprehensive land use plans, and local regulation and enforcement of land
use decisions. It is further the policy of the general assembly that the State Land
Use Commission provide maximum emphasis on developing a statewide land inven-
tory and compiling land use data and projections to aid local governments in land
use decisions.
id.
Clearly, House File 210 has a broader scope and yet it does not ignore the intent of the
enacted legislation. One might note a rural bias in the Senate and a more beneficient eye in
the House toward urban development. There is no reason why urban and rural development
cannot co-exist; in fact, a workable statewide plan makes such cooperation a necessity.
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Preservation Policy Commission' to submit a recommendation, after
holding public hearings, to the state commission within one year after the
effective date of the Act.N The recommendation is to construct both a
state and county land preservation policy. Once its work is completed the
Commission is to be dissolved effective January 1, 1979." Secondly, the
Act creates a Temporary State Land Preservation Policy Commission"'
whose function it is to receive recommendations of the county commis-
268. State Land Preservation Policy Act, supra note 266, at § 3.
269. Id. at § 3 (2). The county commission is charged to work within certain guidelines.
I& at §§ 3 (5) and (6).
[5.1a. The preservation of agricultural land for the production of food and fiber.
b. A review of the available resources, growth trends and land use issues of
the county.
c. A review of the present comprehensive plans, ordinances, regulations and
polices of the local units of government that have an impact on the use of
land.
d. The development of a local land preservation policy for:
(1) Solid waste disposal, sewage treatment and an adequate water supply.
(2) Siting of industrial, commercial, educational, cultural, residential and
recreational facilities.
(3) Designation and appropriate use of critical areas.
(4) Coordination of a countywide transportation system with the state
transportation system.
e. State land preservation guidelines for state agencies.
f. Suggestions for the content of a state land preservation policy and methods
for implementation.
g. The implementation of a county land preservation policy.
h. The preservation of private property rights.
6. The chairperson of the temporary county land preservation policy commission
of each county shall file with the executive secretary of the temporary state land
preservation policy commission a written report by July 1, 1978 containing the
following:
a. The extent to which the county and the cities in the county have
adopted zoning ordinances and have prepared comprehensive plans to be im-
plemented by the zoning ordinances.
b. Whether the county has established a county conservation board and the
extent to which it has adopted a plan for the conservation and recreation
needs of the county.
c. The extent to which the county and the cities and private agencies of the
county have implemented or pending plans for the disposal of solid waste.
d. The extent to which a survey of the soil of the county has been conducted.
e. The extent to which a comprehensive plan for the conservation of soil
resources and the control and preservation of soil erosion has been prepared
and implemented.
I
The requirement of holding public hearings, while laudable, is duplicative of the pro-
cedure used by the Land Use Policies Study Committee, whose work was previously discuss-
ed.
270. Id. at § 3(4).
271. Id at § 4.
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sions and within thirty months from the effective date of the Act, report
to the General Assembly." The report is to include a state land preserva-
tion policy and recommendations concerning methods of implementation.
In developing its policy, the Commission is to consider:
a. The presevation of agricultural land for food and fiber production.
b. The effect of current laws on land use decisions.
c. The recommendation of a state policy for the guidance and direction
of state agencies in the use of land.
d. The criteria for the designation and preservation of critical areas.
e. The designation of key facilities.
f. The designation of large-scale development which will have impact
beyond county boundaries.
g. The control of urban sprawl and the orderly and efficient transition
of land from rural to urban use.
h. The balance of anticipated energy resources and consumption.
i. The protection of private property rights.'
Finally, the Commission is to dissolve upon final action by the General
Assembly.' This apparent holding action reveals a rift between the
House and the Senate concerning the adoption of a comprehensive state
land use policy.
The fact remains that Iowa does have a need for a comprehensive
land use policy. The House proposals are significant steps toward the for-
mulation of a unified plan with the creation of state and county agencies
which do not intend to severely hamper local administration. The state
seeks to administer only certain designated areas that are likely to have
a regional impact, thus providing some semblance of statewide unifor-
mity. ' Further, the state, counties and municipalities must adopt com-
prehensive plans.' 6
This type of land use legislation is a departure from the antiquated
SZEA which forms the basis of Iowa's current land use control system.
Further, the House proposals attempt coordination at the state and coun-
ty levels with provisions that seek to attain statewide uniformity with a
degree of flexibility not allowed in the traditional Euclidian context.
Thus, the State Land Preservation Policy Act, while not as expansive
nor as progressive as the previous House proposals, does give Iowa a cer-
tain minimal direction. The Act provides Iowa with the opportunity to
formulate a comprehensive policy. Given the work performed by the
Land Use Policies Study Committees, together with the guidance of the
Model Land Development Code and state legislation in states such as
Hawaii and Vermont, Iowa is in the advantageous position of developing
272. Id. at § 4(3).
273. Id at § 4(4).
274. Id. at § 8.
275. See D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLS LEGISLATION ch. 11 (1977);
Note, State Land Use Statutes: A Comparative Analysis, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1154 (1977).
276. See H.F. 210, 67th G.A., 1st Sess. (1977) at §§ 5(3), 18(3), and 20(1), respectively.
1977-1978]
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meaningful legislation to correct the deficiencies of land use policies that
have accumulated over the past fifty years."'
VI. CONCLUSION
As Iowa case law reveals, the development of land use controls in
Iowa has been along traditional lines. In fact, the SZEA was adopted
almost in toto and therefore, a limited range of mechanisms are available
to handle land use problems. Iowa has developed a rigid grid system of
zoning as a result of residential development on a lot by lot basis. The
development controls that have been enforced have proved inefficient.
Land use issues have been complicated by the influx of diverse govern-
mental regulations, particularly environmental controls. State and federal
governments are now intruding into an area which traditionally has been
considered a local preserve. Consequently, new techniques and new
methods of'administration are needed.
The response of the Iowa legislature has been to promote the crea-
tion of. a state agency to develop a comprehensive plan and administer
control. over certain designated areas. The statewide plan would be
adapted to federal legislation and would expressly preserve local control.
Thus, from an administrative standpoint, intergovernmental coordination
is possible. Uniformity is likewise fostered by provision for mandatory
comprehensive plans at all levels with a mechanism to review
those plans. Although the House proposals focus on administration rather
than substance, there is an impetus provided for moving away from
Euclidian zoning. This results from a state land use policy that focuses on
im.pet_ rather than simply area, height or use restrictions. The state is
concetned with those users that are likely to have a regional impact.
Statewide land use should also be more adaptable to those types of social,
political and economic issues that are not considered at the local level.
The House proposal will not eliminate Euclidian developments such as
the variance procedure or the inequities inherent in the static law of non-
conforming uses, but it is a step away from a system that places undue
emphasis on segregated use districts. The House proposals can
significantly alter the future development of Iowa land use for the better.
Should a bill similar to the original House File 210 be adopted, it would
make Iowa one of the progressive states that have adopted state policies
for the control and development of their land resources.
277. See Miller, The New Jersey Land Use Law Revision. A Lesson For Other States,
5 REAL EST. L.J. 138 (1976). Compare H.F. 210, 67th G.A., 1st Sess. (1977) with N.J. STAT.
ANN. 40:55D-1 to -91 (Supp. 1971) (the New Jersey law has been called a "disappointment" by
Miller because of its failure to deal with minor procedural matters rather than to cope with
the emerging social, political and economic problems that face us all). Compare H.F. 210, 67th
G.A., 1st Sess. (1977) with HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-1 to -37 (1976) (statewide land use con-
trols) and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-91 (1973) (regionally administered land use controls).
[Vol. 27
HeinOnline  -- 27 Drake L. Rev. 318 1977-1978
